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I. The Evolution of the Arbitration Rules Presently in Effect at
the Various Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)
The resolution of customers' securities disputes by arbitration
can be traced back to 1871 at the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).' Since that time numerous other self-regulatory organiza-
tions (SROs) have established arbitration programs for the resolu-
tion of such disputes. 2
To fully understand the rules presently governing arbitration at
SRO forums, and elsewhere, we must look at the development of
the present system. We must explore the judicial developments
that have channeled such disputes into arbitration 3 and also ex-
amine legislative attempts to alter or influence the process of se-
curities arbitration.4 Finally, we must look at the establishment
and impact of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
(SICA) over the past twenty years,5 the SRO's participation in the
process, the oversight role of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion 6 (SEC or Commission), and the alternative forum offered by
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in this area.
Securities arbitration is a vast topic concerning various issues,
many of which could be the subject of their own article. This article
is an overview of the area which, by necessity, must be brief and
concise, and unfortunately cannot fully explore and develop each
of these issues. Accordingly, the coverage is intended to be broad
and to express the views of litigants from both sides of the spec-
trum. On the other hand, the author does, from time to time, ex-
press his personal opinions based upon his experiences and
1. PHILIP J. HOBLIN, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES,
CASES 1-2 (2d ed. 1992). See also Deborah Masucci & Robert S. Clemente, Securities
Arbitration At The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Secur-
ities Dealers, Inc.-Administration and Procedures, in 1 SECURITIES ARBITRATION
1995, at 291, 295 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-899, 1995).
2. See HOBLIN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
3. See infra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 23-46 and accompanying text. See also Symposium, New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in The Securities Industry, 63 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1495, 1507-8 (1995) [hereinafter NYSE SyMPOsItm]. The NYSE Sym-
posium was held in the Fall of 1994. On May 30, 1995, the NYSE issued a Report
thereon which listed several recommendations and conclusions [hereinafter NYSE
REPORT]. As to comments received in response to the issues raised by the NYSE
Report, see Robert S. Clemente, Remarks at- seminar, sponsored by Glasser
LegalWorks, entitled, "Securities Arbitration and Litigation: The Changing Land-
scape" (New York, N.Y., Apr. 29, 1996).
6. See infra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 279-303 and accompanying text.
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observations as an arbitrator and a Public Member of SICA as to
what is necessary to preserve the public's trust in the integrity of
the SRO arbitration process. Absent such trust, securities arbitra-
tion cannot remain the basically mandatory system that it is today.
A. Judicial Developments
An unresolved dispute between an investor and his broker ordi-
narily ends in arbitration because of an agreement entered into at
the time a customer opens a brokerage account. 8 Indeed, such
agreements are common, particularly in the case of margin or op-
tion accounts. 9
Under the United States Arbitration Act (Federal Arbitration
Act or Arbitration Act), agreements to arbitrate future disputes
are, in general, specifically enforceable. 10 Prior to 1987, however,
there was an exception recognized for customers' claims which
arose under the Securities Act of 193311 (1933 Act or Securities
Act). 12 Faced with the Hobson's choice between the mandate of
the Arbitration Act to arbitrate, and provisions in the Securities
Act intended to protect the customer's rights, the Supreme Court
8. SRO rules require that their membership consent to arbitrate disputes upon
the demand of their customers. By belonging to the SRO, its members agree to be
bound by the SRO's rules. Consequently, customers of an SRO may compel a mem-
ber of an SRO to arbitrate even without a written agreement to arbitrate; however,
absent a written contract, the member cannot compel the customer to arbitrate. Hob-
fin, supra note 1, at 2-3 - 2-4.
9. It would appear that such agreements are largely in effect with respect to mar-
gin, option and commodity accounts, and, to a lesser degree, cash accounts. See Ann
C. Stansbury & Justin P. Klein, The Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes: A Sum-
mary of Development, 35 ARB. J. 30, 32 (1980); see also C. FLETCHER, DYNAMISM IN
SECURITIES ARBITRATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES
SEMINAR 14 (1989). A "1988 SEC study of 65 brokerage firms showed that 61% of all
cash accounts had no arbitration agreement in effect; 6% of margin accounts had no
arbitration agreement; and, 5% of option accounts had no arbitration agreement."
Id. This difference probably stems from the fact that the latter two usually involve
greater risk or an extension of some form of credit by the firm to the customer, thus
increasing the need for speedy resolution of problems through arbitration.
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides: [A] written
provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration, a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. Id. at § 2 (emphasis added). Because the Federal Ar-
bitration Act applies to claims arising from transactions involving interstate com-
merce, id., and because securities dealings usually involve such transactions, state
securities claims, as well as those arising under the federal securities laws, are usually
arbitrable.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
12. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 293-95 (1984) [hereinafter Katsoris I].
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in Wilko v. Swan13-expressing some mistrust of arbitration-con-
cluded that Congress' desire to protect investors would be more
effectively served by holding unenforceable any pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements relating to issues arising under the 1933 Act.'4
Subsequently, most federal courts presumed that the Wilko prohi-
bition also extended to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act or Exchange Act),'15 and thus, despite the existence of pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements, refused to compel arbitration of cus-
tomers' claims arising under the 1934 Act-even when intertwined
with an arbitrable non-federal securities claim.' 6
In 1987, however, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon17 specifically ruled that the Wilko exemp-
tion did not apply to 1934 Act claims. Further, in 1989, in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,18 the Court ex-
pressly overruled Wilko and held that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements were enforceable, including claims arising under the
1933 Act.19 Therefore, as a result of the McMahon and Rodriquez
decisions, most securities disputes are now arbitrated pursuant to
pre-dispute arbitration agreements.2 °
In the aftermath of McMahon, however, both Congress and the
legislatures of several states made attempts to render pre-dispute
securities arbitration agreements unenforceable; 21 but, such efforts
were unsuccessful.22
13. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
14. Id. at 438. As to the Wilko court's mistrust of arbitration, see also infra notes
345-47 and accompanying text.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
16. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 361, 364-67 (1988) [hereinafter Katsoris II]. See also Constantine N.
Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 7 (1986)
[hereinafter Katsoris III]. While the Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), did not specifically resolve the issue of whether Wilko
applied to the 1934 Act claims, it did hold that when an arbitrable claim is joined with
a non-arbitrable Wilko claim, it would not order the two be tried together, even
though they were intertwined. Katsoris III, at 8.
17. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See also NYSE SYMPOsIUM, supra note 5, at 1507-08.
18. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
19. Id. at 483-85; see Arbitration and the Demise of Wilko v. Swan, N.Y. L.J., June
15, 1989, at 3.
20. SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION
1 (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter SIXTH REPORT].
21. See Draft Bill To Restrict Use of Pre-Dispute Agreements, SEC. ARB. COMMEN-
TATOR, June 1988, at 4; Markey to SEC: What Happened?, SEC. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR, July 1988, at 1; State Actions on Pre-Dispute Clauses, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
Aug. 1988, at 1.
22. See Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connoly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly-Massachusetts Arbi-
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B. Creation of SICA and the Role of the SEC
Prior to 1976, the various SROs had differing rules for the ad-
ministration of securities arbitration disputes.23 In June 1976, the
SEC solicited comments from interested persons on the feasibility
of developing a "uniform system of dispute grievance procedures
for the adjudication of small claims. ' 24 After conducting public
hearings at which written and oral comments were received, the
SEC's Office of Consumer Affairs issued a report recommending
the adoption of procedures for handling investor disputes and the
creation of a new entity to administer the system. 5 Prior to imple-
menting that proposal, however, the Commission invited further
comment. 6
In response to this request, several SROs proposed the establish-
ment of a securities industry task force to consider the develop-
ment of a "uniform arbitration code and the means for establishing
a more efficient, economic and appropriate mechanism for resolv-
ing investor disputes involving small sums of money. 27 As a result
of this proposal, SICA was established in April 1977, consisting of
tration Rules Preempted, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Aug. 1989, at 2; Stan Hinden,
GAO Asked To Investigate Securities Arbitration Issues, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1990, at 2;
Markey to SEC: What Happened?, supra note 20, at 1. But see Stock Arbitration Case
in Top Court, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 1990, at 37. As to whether the public voluntarily
enters into such agreements, see supra notes 27, 28 and accompanying text; see also R.
Ryder, Securities Arbitration in 1989; Reviewing the Case Law, Securities Arbitration
Practice and Procedures, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Nov. 1989, at 7(seminar).
23. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 283.
24. Securitues Exchange Act Release No. 12,528, 9 SEC DOCKET 833, 834 (June 9,
1976).
25. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,974, 10 SEC DOCKET 955-56 (Nov.
15, 1976).
26. Id. at 955, 956.
27. FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION
2 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT]. See James E. Buck, Statement of the New
York Stock Exchange Before the Securities Exchange Commission Hearing on Re-
lease Number 34-12974, at 5 (Feb. 9, 1977) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law
Journal) (testimony of then-Secretary of the NYSE urging the creation of SICA).
"[T]he Exchange does believe that the development of a uniform system of arbitra-
tion to be used by the self-regulatory agencies would be in the interest of investors
and the securities industry." Id. at 3.
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representatives of various SROs,28 the public,2 9 and the Securities
Industry Association (SIA)2 °
In accordance with its mandate, SICA initially developed a sim-
plified arbitration procedure for res olving customers' small claims
($2,500 or less) and published an informational booklet describing
these procedures (Small Claims Booklet). 31 Recognizing that the
development of a small claims procedure was merely a first step,
SICA proceeded to develop a comprehensive Uniform Code of
Arbitration (Uniform Code or Code) for use in larger claims, with
the small claims procedures becoming part of the Uniform Code.32
In addition, SICA prepared an informational booklet for prospec-
28. The following SROs were represented: the American (ASE), Boston (BSE),
Cincinnati (CSE), Midwest (MSE), New York (NYSE), Pacific (PSE) and Philadel-
phia (PHLX) Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.
29. Peter R. Celia, Jr., Esq. Mortimer Goodman, Esq. and the author were ap-
pointed Public Members of SICA at its creation in 1977. Id. In 1983, Justin Klein,
Esq., was added as a fourth Public Member of SICA. Id. Mortimer Goodman did not
seek re-appointment as a Public Member as of the end of 1989, and a new public
member, James Beckley, Esq., was appointed in his place. The current Public Mem-
bers' terms shall expire, one each year, beginning on December 31, 1993. Constantine
N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1113, 1117 n.27
(1993) [hereinafter Katsoris IV]. All new members serve for four years and are eligi-
ble for one additional four-year term. The Public Members whose terms are not ex-
piring will determine the appointment of new members, or reappointment. Id. The
appointment, or reappointment, may be vetoed by a two-thirds vote of the non-public
members of SICA. Id. Accordingly, in 1995, Thomas R. Grady, Esq. was appointed to
replace Justin Klein, and in 1996 Professor Thomas J. Stipanowich was appointed to
replace Peter R. Celia. Moreover, at a special meeting in July 1995, SICA decided
that upon the expiration of the author's term at the end of 1996, the Public Members
on SICA will revert to three, as was the case when SICA was first created. Public
Members, whose terms have expired, continue to be invited as guests to SICA meet-
ings to act in an advisory capacity. See also infra note 30 as to other guests regularly
invited to SICA meetings.
30. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 3. The SIA is a trade association for the
securities industry. In addition, members of the staff of the SEC, the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
and the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) are regu-
larly invited to attend the SICA meetings.
31. SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, How To PROCEED
WITH THE ARBITRATION OF A SMALL CLAIM [hereinafter SMALL CLAIMS BOOK-
LET], reprinted in REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION To THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION; PROPOSALS To ESTABLISH A
UNIFORM SYSTEM FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CUSTOMER DISPUTES INVOLVING
SMALL CLAIMS, Exhibit D (Nov. 15, 1977) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
32. See Uniform Code of Arbitration (as amended), reprinted in FOURTH REPORT
OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, Exhibit C (Nov. 1984)
[hereinafter FOURTH REPORT]. The small claims procedure was incorporated into § 2
of the Code. See Uniform Code § 2, infra Appendix A.
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tive claimants (Procedures Booklet)33 explaining, in simple terms
and by examples, the arbitration procedures under the Code. To a
large extent, SICA's Uniform Code incorporated and harmonized
the rules of the various SROs and codified various procedures that
the SROs had previously followed, but had not formalized in their
existing rules.34
C. The Present Uniform Code
The Uniform Code of Arbitration was adopted by the participat-
ing SROs during 1979 and 1980,35 and appears in the Second Re-
port of SICA to the SEC.36 Since its initial adoption and before
the McMahon case in 1987, various revisions were made to the
Code and the Procedures Booklet. These changes were reported in
the Third, Fourth and Fifth Reports of SICA to the SEC.37
In 1987, the SEC, recognizing the broad implications of the Mc-
Mahon decision, dispatched to SICA a list of recommendations for
changes to SRO arbitration procedures, and solicited SICA's com-
ments on these proposed changes.38 Most of these issues addressed
by the SEC had already been under consideration at SICA, and
SICA responded that it was generally in agreement with the SEC's
33. Securities Industry Conference On Arbitration, ARBITRATION PROCEDURES
[hereinafter PROCEDURES BOOKLET], reprinted in THIRD REPORT OF THE SECURI-
TIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION To THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Exhibit B (Jan. 31, 1980) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT]. After McMa-
hon, SICA consolidated the SMALL CLAIMS BOOKLET, supra note 31, into the PROCE-
DURES BOOKLET, supra. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
34. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 284.
35. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 4. Once SICA adopts a new rule, each SRO
must then generally go back to their respective organization for approval in order to
get a rule change which is then usually submitted to the SEC for approval. Accord-
ingly, there is often a time lag between SICA approval and SRO adoption.
36. See SECOND REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Exhibit A (Dec. 28,
1978) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT].
37. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 33, at 3; FOURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at 3-
4; FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 4-6.
38. See Letter from SEC to SICA (Sept. 10, 1987) [hereinafter SEC Letter], re-
printed in JAMES H. SCHROPP, SECURITIES ARBITRATION, NEW APPROACHES TO SE-
CURITIES COUNSELING AND LITIGATION AFTER McMahon 141-53 (1988). The SEC's
proposals principally revolved around such issues as: selection, qualification, back-
ground, training and evaluation of arbitrators; challenges for cause; method of tran-
scribing and preserving the record of arbitration hearings; written outline and
explanation of the basis for an award; pre-hearing discovery, depositions and ex-
change of documents; expanding the use of educational pamphlets; increased pressure
on SRO arbitration systems brought about by the anticipated increased case load;
adherence to Rule 19b-4; notification of abuses to disciplinary authorities; and large
cases. Id.
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proposals.39 Because there were honest disagreements on certain
points, however, extensive discussions between SICA and the SEC
ensued, leading to many changes to the Code, which were adopted
and reported in SICA's Sixth Report.4°
Since the adoption of the Uniform Code, SICA has met quar-
terly, (or more frequently when necessary) to monitor the perform-
ance of the Code in action with a view towards further fine-tuning,
adjusting, and amending its provisions based upon its own observa-
tions and comments from those interested in the arbitration pro-
cess. Moreover, since the Sixth Report, SICA has made many
significant amendments to the Code which are discussed in SICA's
Seventh 41 and Eighth Reports. 42 The present Uniform Code, as of
March 1996, is attached hereto as Appendix A.43
A few months following McMahon, on October 19, 1987, the se-
curities markets experienced "Black Monday," when the Dow/
Jones Industrial Average plunged 508 points (a 22.6% decline) in
one trading day." Between the 1987 mandate of the Supreme
Court in McMahon regarding arbitrability, and the disruption of
the securities markets on Black Monday, SRO arbitrations ex-
ploded in 1988 to over 6,000 filings-more than double the number
of cases filed in 1986.45 To date, over 65,000 cases, including small
claims, have been filed with the participating SROs since the initial
approval of the Code.46
39. See SICA Letter to Richard G. Ketchum (Dec. 14, 1987), reprinted in
SCHROPP, supra note 38, at 154-69.
40. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 1-3. This Report was sent to the SEC in
the summer of 1989.
41. See SEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION 6 (July 1991) [hereinafter SEVENTH REPORT].
42. See EIGHTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION 3 (June 1994) [hereinafter EIGHTH REPORT]. The Ninth Report of SICA to
the SEC is scheduled to be released this summer.
43. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, infra Appendix A.
44. See Jeffrey M. Ladermanin, Welcome Back To The Wall Street Funhouse, Bus.
WK., Oct. 30, 1989, at 27.
45. The bulk of said arbitrations are handled before the NASD and NYSE. See
infra Appendix B.
46. The bulk of said arbitrations are handled before the NASD and the NYSE. A
breakdown of the arbitrations handled by the arbitration facilities of the various
SROs appears infra Appendix B.
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II. Analysis of Present Uniform Code of Arbitration
Section 1 - Arbitration
Section 1 of the Code delineates the jurisdictional reach of SRO
arbitration, which permits an SRO to accept a matter upon the de-
mand of a customer or nonmember, even absent an agreement; 47
however, it also recognizes an SRO's right to decline the use of its
facilities where the dispute, claim, or controversy is not a proper
subject matter for arbitration.48
Section 1 remained basically unchanged from the original ver-
sion until the addition of subdivision (d), which was adopted, after
much debate, and specifically prohibits the submission of a claim as
a class action.4 9 This prohibition of class actions, however, had no
effect upon the consolidation or joinder of claims, which are still
specifically permitted by Section 13(d) of the Code. Furthermore,
the Code permits claimants to join in a class action pending in
Court despite an agreement to arbitrate;50 however, the claimants
may file such claims in arbitration only if they have elected not to
participate in or have withdrawn from the class action 1.5
Section 2 - Simplified Arbitration
Section 2 of the Code deals with Simplified Arbitration proce-
dures52 whereby small claims can be resolved more quickly and at
less cost than larger claims; otherwise, the cost to arbitrate could
often exceed any recovery.53 Initially this section applied only to
disputes where the dollar amount in controversey did not exceed
$2,500. This amount was later increased to $5,000,54 and, finally to
47. Uniform Code of Arbitration § l(a), infra Appendix A.
48. Id. § 1(b). See also Gutfreund v. Weiner, 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995). When the
New York Stock Exchange declined to arbitrate a shareholder's derivative suit against
defendants whose employment agreements specified that forum, the Second Circuit
refused to compel arbitration in another forum. Id. at 557.
49. See EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 42, at 6-7.
50. Id.
51. Id. See also Uniform Code of Arbitration .§ 31(e), infra Appendix A, which
provides, inter alia, that pre-arbitration dispute agreements must state that no person
shall seek to enforce any pre-dispute arbitration agreement against any person who
has initiated in court a class action or who is a member of the putative class who has
not opted out, until either: the class certification is denied; or, the class is decertified;
or, the customer is excluded from the class by the court.
52. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 2, infra Appendix A.
53. In essence, this enhances the fairness of arbitration procedures, for even those
with small claims can partake.
54. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at 3.
SICA
its present $10,00055 limit. As a result, deposits and other costs in-
creased from a flat $15 fee to a present sliding dollar related claim
scale ($15 to $200).56 Additionally, various amendments were
made to the Code to resolve possible inconsistencies or ambiguities
concerning simplified arbitration and other sections of the Code,
including pre-hearing discovery procedures.57
Section 3 - Hearing Requirements - Waiver of Hearing
This section provides that, except for small claims, each dispute,
claim or controversy shall require a hearing, unless waived by the
parties. 58
Section 4 - Eligibility
Section 4 establishes a six year time limitation for the submission
of a claim to arbitration (Six Year Rule) from the time of the oc-
currence or event giving rise to the claim.59 This six year provision
does not extend applicable statutes of limitation.6 ° The Six Year
Rule was inserted as a matter of administrative convenience at a
time when: (i) arbitration was basically voluntary on the public's
part; (ii) there were no formal discovery rules; and, (iii) limited
partnerships, which have been the subject of much litigation since
the late 1980's, were not contemplated.6 ' It was never the intent of
SICA to invalidate claims by this rule, but merely to articulate that
claims over six years old could not be submitted to an SRO forum
for arbitration.62
Unfortunately, some courts have interpreted the Six Year Rule
as barring such claims.63 To correct that misunderstanding, subdi-
visions (b) and (c) were added in 1993 to Section 4, giving the Di-
rector of Arbitration the authority to make a final determination as
55. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 2(a), infra Appendix A. SEC Approves NASD
Proposal to Raise Ceiling for Simplified Arbitrations, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
20, at 560 (Apr. 15, 1988).
56. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at 3; Uniform Code of Arbitration § 2(c),
infra Appendix B.
57. SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 41, at 6.
58. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 3, infra Appendix A.
59. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 4, infra Appendix A.
60. Id.
61. See NYSE SYmPOSIUm, supra note 5, at 1533-49; See also Katsoris IV, supra
note 29, at 1123.
62. Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1123.
63. See NYSE SyMPOSiUM, supra note 5, at 1534.
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to whether a claim is eligible for submission to arbitration.' . Fur-
thermore, these amendments to the Six Year Rule made it clear
that a finding of ineligibility by the Director of Arbitration shall
not constitute a bar to asserting the underlying claim in a judicial
forum, despite the existence of a pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment.65 Unfortunately, no SRO has yet adopted these amend-
ments.66 The NASD filed a much expanded version of these
amendments in a Rule 19(b) filing, but subsequently withdrew it
after much opposition and many questions were raised regarding
its adoption.6 7
The Six Year Rule has inadvertantly and needlessly complicated
the arbitration process. Indeed, various courts are in conflict as to
who should decide the threshold issue of eligibility: the courts or
the arbitrators. 68 The AAA has no similar provision, despite secur-
ities industry involvement in the development of its securities arbi-
tration rules. This is perhaps one of the reasons brokerage firms do
not include the AAA as an alternative to the SRO forums in their
arbitration agreements. For these and other reasons, abolition of
the Six Year Rule from the SICA Code has been suggested by the
author, and recently endorsed by the Ruder Report.69
Section 5 - Dismissal of Proceedings
The original version of Section 5 gave arbitrators the discretion
to dismiss the arbitration proceedings at any time upon their own
initiative or upon the joint request of the parties.70 The section was
subsequently changed, before McMahon, to its present version, by
64. But see EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 42, at 4 (noting that further clarification
of this issue has been proposed).
65. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 4(c), infra Appendix A.
66. See NYSE SYMPosIUM, supra note 5, at 1539 n.79.
67. Id. See New and Pending SRO Arbitration Rules (Table), SEC. ARB. COMMEN-
TATOR, July 1995, at 29; Carroll E. Neesemann & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of Se-
curities Arbitration, in 1 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1995, at 135, 280 (PLI Corp. Law
& Prac. course Handbook Series No. B-899, 1995). See also Emil Bukhman, Note,
Time Limits on Arbitrability of Securities Industry Disputes Under the Arbitration
Rules of Self Regulatory Organizations, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 194-95 (1995) (rec-
ommending that the NASD withdraw the proposed amendments).
68. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1534. See also Dominic Bencivenga,
Securities Threshold; Should Judges or Arbitrators Decide Eligibility?, N.Y. L.J., Nov.
9, 1995, at 5.
69. NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1539. A more complete discussion of the
RUDER REPORT (ENTITLED, SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE
POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. (January 1996)) follows below, infra at part V.
70. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-4.
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extending the discretionary power to arbitrators to dismiss claims
in situations where only one party so requests, and by making the
dismissal mandatory where the request is jointly made by the par-
ties.71 Rightly or wrongly, most arbitrators rarely dismiss a matter
before the hearing, preferring to hear part or all of the case before
doing so, particularly in pro se cases.72
Finally, in September, 1995, SICA made two amendments to
Section 5. First, it amended subdivision (a) to enable the arbitra-
tors, upon dimissal of the arbitration, to refer the parties not only
to their judicial remedies, but also to any other dispute resolution
forum agreed to by the parties without prejudice to any claims or
defenses available to any party, or other remedies provided by law.
Furthermore, SICA also added subdivision (b), which specifically
provides that arbitrators may dismiss a claim, defense or proceed-
ing with prejudice as a sanction for willful and intentional failure to
comply with an order of the arbitrators if lesser sanctions have
proven ineffective.
Section 6 - Settlements
This section provided that "all settlements upon any matter sub-
mitted shall be at the election of the parties," and it remained un-
changed from the original version73 until recently. After the Sixth
Report, SICA removed the words "upon any matter," as redun-
dant, so that the section now simply reads: "[a]ll settlements sub-
mitted shall be at the election of the parties.
74
In 1993, the NASD sua sponte filed with the SEC a Rule 19(b)
filing that would have established a formal procedure for parties, in
arbitration proceedings involving at least $250,000 in total dam-
ages, to make pre-hearing settlement offers (Offer of Award
71. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 33, at C-3.
72. Cf Richard E. Lerner, Sources of Help for Pro Se Claimants, 6 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Jan. 1994, at 13 (listing alternatives to full legal representation).
73. SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-4. See generally Theodore A. Kreb-
sbach, Settlement of Broker Dealer Arbitrations, in 1 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1995,
at 659 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac. Course Handbook Series No.B-899, 1995)(discussing
the settlement process).
74. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 6, infra Appendix A. With greater frequency,
settlement agreements include a confidentiality clause which prohibits the customer
from disclosing settlement terms and the underlying facts of the dispute. In this re-
gard, NASD Notice To Members 95-87 "admonishes broker-dealers not to use confi-
dentiality provisions which might impede NASD investigations." NASD NTM 95-87
Warns Firms Re Confidentiality Clauses in Settlement Accords. SEC. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR, Jan. 1995, at 19.
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Rule).75 The proposed rule change was to expire after two years.76
It would have required parties who reject such settlement offers to
pay the offering party's reasonable costs (including expert witness
fees) and attorneys fees incurred after the offer was made, if the
award granted in the ensuing arbitration was not more favorable to
the rejecting party than the settlement offer."
Although this proposal, on its face, seemed to encourage settle-
ments of large and costly disputes, it was the unanimous conclusion
of the Public Members of SICA and most of the other SROs that,
on balance, such a rule change would have an unwelcome and de-
cidedly coercive effect upon public claimants to accept a settlement
offer rather than risk being assessed with the excessive costs and
attorneys fees of the opposing party.78 Moreover, since the thresh-
old sum of $250,000 included punitive damages, the proposed rule
would have had the additional effect of compelling claimants to
reduce or eliminate a punitive damage claim so as: to avoid crossing
the threshold and thereby being subjected to the Offer of Award
Rule.79
A proposal similar to the Offer of Award Rule found little sup-
port among the other SICA members, 0 including the arbitration
directors of the other SROs.8 ' The NASD withdrew its Offer of
Award Rule in 19 94 .82
Section 7 - Tolling of Tune Limitation(s) for The Institution of
Legal Proceedings
This section originally provided for the tolling of time limitations
for the institution of legal proceedings from the time when all par-
ties filed duly executed Submission Agreements and continued for
such period as the SRO retained jurisdiction over the matter.8 3
75. Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1149. See also Exchange Act Release No. 33,081,
55 SEC DOCKET 620 (Oct. 20, 1993).
76. See Exchange Act Release No. 33,081 (Oct. 20, 1993).
77. Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1149.
78. Id.
79. Id at 1149-50.
80. Id. at 1150-51.
81. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Offer of Award Rule
was denounced as adding "a new element of unfairness to a system that already tilts
towards brokers." Michael Schroeder, Wall Street Should Stop Playing the Bully, Bus.
WK., Dec. 20, 1993, at 92. See Richard Karp, Wall Street's New Nightmare, BARRON'S,
Feb. 21, 1994, at 15; NASAA Opposes NASD Proposal On Arbitration Settlement Of-
fers, 26 SEC. REG & L. REP. (BNA) 75 (Jan. 21, 1994).
82. Michael Siconolfi, NASD Withdraws 'Loser Pays' Arbitration Proposal, WALL
ST. J., July 7, 1994, at C1.
83. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-4.
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The section was subsequently expanded, prior to McMahon, to its
present version which requires: (1) that applicable time limitations
for the institution of legal proceedings shall be tolled from the time
a duly executed Submission Agreement is filed by the claimant or
claimants (instead of all the parties);84 and (2) that the six year
limitation period for the bringing of arbitration proceedings, as
provided in Section 4, is to be extended by any period during which
a court of competent jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over the mat-
ter submitted.8 5 The reasoning is that it would be unfair to a claim-
ant for such limitations to continue to run once the claim is
submitted to arbitration, or is being adjudicated in court.
Section 8 - Designation of the Number of Arbitrators
This section deals with the composition of the arbitration panels.
It grants the SRO Director of Arbitration the authority to choose
the panel and its chairman, and directs that the majority of the
panel of arbitrators shall not be from the securities industry (public
arbitrators), unless the public customer or "non-member" requests
otherwise. s6
The selection of arbitrators at SRO forums does not employ the
so-called tri-partite selection system, whereunder each party picks
an arbitrator and the two appointees pick a third. 7 Rather, the
SRO arbitration forums select the proposed arbitration panels, and
Section 10 of the Code provides that each party shall have one per-
emptory challenge, and unlimited challenges for cause.88
The original section provided for panels of three members for
matters in controversy which did not exceed $100,000 and five
84. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at C-3; Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 7(a), infra Appendix A.
85. FoURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at C-3; Uniform Code of Arbitration § 7(a),
infra Appendix A.
86. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 8(a), infra Appendix A. The term "nonmem-
ber" was added to the section after McMahon. See SixTm REPORT, supra note 20, at
6.
87. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
419, 455 (1989) [hereinafter Katsoris V]. See George H. Friedman & Florence M.
Peterson When You Have a Choice of Forum: The differences Between Securities Arbi-
tration at the AAA and the SROs, in 1 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1995, at 555, 564
(PLI Corp. Law & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-899, 1995). At the AAA,
the parties select arbitrators from a list of proposed panelists. Id.
88. Id See also Edward W. Morris, Arbitrator Assignment - The Case For
Agency Selection, SEc. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1989, at 1, 3. Section 10 of the
Uniform Code authorizes the Director of Arbitration to grant additional peremptory
challenges, if doing so best serves the interest of justice.
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members for matters in excess of that amount.89 For reasons of
economy and efficiency, that has been pared down to three person
panels for controversies exceeding $10,000, or where no money
claim is involved or disclosed.90 In claims involving $10,000 or less,
only one arbitrator is appointed; and, the NASD has extended this
one arbitrator rule to claims involving $30,000 or less, unless a
party demands a panel of three. 91 Nevertheless, some public arbi-
trators who may not be familiar with securities industry practices
might feel uncomfortable sitting alone without the benefit of the
knowledge and experience of an industry arbitrator.9z
Although this section always provided that the majority of the
arbitrators on any panel involving a public customer or non-mem-
ber be public arbitrators (i.e. not affiliated with the securities in-
dustry), no further guidance was given by the original Code
regarding who qualified as a public arbitrator.93 The original ver-
sion of the Procedures Booklet, however, described public arbitra-
tors as "individuals who are neither associated with, nor employed
by a broker-dealer or securities industry organization." 94 SICA ini-
tially left this test flexible so that the experience of many needed
and qualified persons would not be lost. As time went on, how-
ever, it became apparent that the category of public arbitrators had
to be more clearly defined. Accordingly, Guidelines for the Classi-
fication of Public Arbitrators were added to the Procedures
Booklet.95
After McMahon, however, SICA further tightened the classifica-
tion of public arbitrators by amending Section 8 of the Code to
specifically exclude as public arbitrators: (1) brokers and regis-
tered investment advisers and persons who are retired from the
securities industry; (2) persons who had been employed in the in-
dustry in the past three years; (3) professionals, i.e., attorneys or
accountants, who devote 20% or more of their work efforts to se-
curities industry clients; and (4) spouses of industry personnel.96
89. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 33, at C-4.
90. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 6.
91. See Deborah Masucci, Maintaining the Fairness of Arbitration, SECURITIES AR-
BITRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE SEMINAR 144-45 (Nov. 17, 1989).
92. Id. Section 2(i) of the Uniform Code specifically provides that the single arbi-
trator can request the appointment of two additional arbitrators.
93. See FiFrtH REPORT, supra note 27, at 32.
94. See PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 33, at 3.
95. See FIF-H REPORT, supra note 27, at 17.
96. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 6-7. The NYSE guidelines for the classi-
fication of public arbitrators are even more stringent. See Katsoris II, supra note 16,
at 378 n.98. Indeed, such NYSE guidelines provide that "[any close question on arbi-
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Furthermore, subsection (v) was later added (to subdivision (a)(2)
of Section 8 of the Code), which expanded the definition of securi-
ties arbitrators to include an individual who is registered under the
Commodities Exchange Act or is a member of a registered futures
association or any commodities exchange or is associated with any
such person(s).97
As a result of some criticism of the present method of selection,
some SROs are experimenting with, or considering adopting, a
procedure for a random generation of lists of potential arbitrators
similar to that used at the AAA, instead of having arbitrators ap-
pointed by the SRO itself. Such a change has recently been sug-
gested by the Ruder Report.98
Section 9 - Notice of Selection of Arbitrators
Before McMahon, Section 9 merely required the Director of Ar-
bitration to inform the parties of the names and business affilia-
tions of the arbitrators at least eight business days prior to the date
of the initial hearing session.99 Since McMahon, the section has
been significantly expanded. 100
The Director of Arbitration now must also inform the parties of
the arbitrators' employment histories for the past ten years in addi-
tion to expanded disclosures required by Section 11.101 Moreover,
a party's right to make further inquiry Of the Director concerning
an arbitrator's background is now included in the rule.10 2 Previ-
ously, this right was only mentioned in the Procedures Booklet.'0
3
In addition, the expansion of Section 9 grants the Director the
power to designate a replacement arbitrator in the event an ap-
pointed arbitrator becomes disqualified, resigns, dies, refuses, or
trator classification or on challenges for cause shall be decided in favor of public cus-
tomers." Id. See also Mary Neal, Securities Arbitration Administration and
Procedures at the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., in SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION 1989, at 656-57 (PLI Seminar); Scott I. Noah & Janice M. Stroughter, Arbitration
At The American Stock Exchange, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, at 579-80 (PLI
Seminar).
97. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, infra Appendix A.
98. See RUDER REPORT, infra note 307 and accompanying text; NYSE SYMPO-
siuM, supra note 5, at 1679-93. See also supra notes 86-8 and accompanying text.
99. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-5. At its September, 1995 meeting,
SICA increased this notice requirement to fifteen days prior to the date of the initial
hearing.
100. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 7.
101. Id. In September, 1995, SICA extended this disclosure requirement to fifteen
(from eight) business days prior to the date fixed for the initial hearing session.
102. Id.
103. See PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 33, at 6.
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otherwise is unable to perform prior to the first hearing. 1°4 Consis-
tent with the other provisions of Section 9, the replacement provi-
sion also imposes disclosure requirements upon the replacement
arbitrator, so as to meaningfully preserve the right to challenge the
replacement arbitrator under Section 10.105 Vacancies occurring
after the commencement of the first hearing are specifically cov-
ered by Section 12.106
Section 10 - Challenges
Initially, Section 10 dealt only with peremptory challenges and
granted one such challenge to each party only when panels con-
sisted of more than one arbitrator.10 7 Thereafter the peremptory
challenge was extended (similar to the present rule) to all panels
(regardless of size).'0 8 The new section limits multiple claimants,
respondents and third-party respondents to one peremptory chal-
lenge, unless the Director determines that, in the interest of justice,
the granting of such additional challenges is warranted. 0 9 The sec-
tion was further amended at that time to specifically permit unlim-
ited challenges for cause.110
Section 11 - Disclosures Required by Arbitrators
Section 11 initially required each arbitrator to disclose to the Di-
rector of Arbitration any circumstances which might preclude such
arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determina-
tion."' The section was soon expanded to specifically authorize
the Director to remove such an arbitrator before the commence-
ment of the first hearing, or in the absence of removal, to inform
the parties of any such information."12
104. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 9, infra Appendix A.
105. See Uniform Code of Arbitration §§ 9, 10, infra Appendix A. In September,
1995 SICA extended the parties' time for background inquiries and peremptory chal-
lenges of the replacement arbitrators to ten days (from five).
106. Id
107. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-5.
108. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at C-4.
109. Id; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 10, infra Appendix A. Originally,
a party had five business days after notification of the panel's identity, unless ex-
tended by the Director of Arbitration. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36 at A-5.
SICA has recently amended Section 10 to increase the period for exercising peremp-
tory challenges from five business days to ten business days from notification. See
Uniform Code of Arbitration § 10, infra Appendix A.
110. See FouRTH REPORT, supra note 32, at C-4.
111. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-5.
112. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 33, at C-5.
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After McMahon, the section was expanded to parallel Canon II
of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
(Code of Ethics) by explicitly imposing a duty upon the arbitrator
to disclose any potential conflict, a duty which continues through-
out the proceeding.' 13 To facilitate this process, arbitrators now re-
ceive a copy of the Arbitators' Code of Ethics each time they are
assigned to a case in order to highlight the types of disclosures re-
quired. In addition, arbitrators receive a copy of SICA's Arbitra-
tor's Manual (Manual) which was developed to instruct arbitrators
concerning their duties and responsibilities." 4
Section 12 - Disqualification or Other Disability of Arbitrators
Before McMahon, this section simply provided that if an arbitra-
tor became disabled or disqualified after the commencement of the
first session, the Director of Arbitration could either appoint a re-
placement or allow the arbitration to proceed with the remaining
panel.' 1 5 In either case, further hearings required the consent or
waiver of the parties. 116 In the absence of consent or waiver, the
hearings had to start de novo." 7 Because this often resulted in
wasted time and effort, the section was amended after McMahon to
allow the hearings to continue before the remaining arbitrators
when a vacancy occurs, unless one of the parties objects. 1 8 In the
event of an objection, the Director shall appoint a new member to
fill the vacancy. 119 The section, as it presently stands, preserves the
113. For example, the Code of Ethics requires that an arbitrator reveal any direct
or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration, and any
existing or past financial, business, professional, family or social relationships, which
are likely to affect impartiality or that might reasonably create an appearance of bias.
See Katsoris V, supra note 87, at 437.
114. Id THE ARBITRATORS MANUAL (1989). See also Rosemary J. Shockman &
John N. McKeegan, Arbitrator Investigation and Selection, in 1 SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION 1995, at 605 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac. course Handbook Series No. B-899, 1995);
Karen Kupersmith, A Perspective on the Role of the Arbitrator in Securities Arbitra-
tion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297 (1996).
115. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-6, A-7.
116. Id.
117. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
118. See id. at 8.
119. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 12, infra Appendix A. In this con-
nection, an interesting decision was rendered in New York in McMahon & Co. v.
Dunn New-Fund I Ltd., where a State Supreme court judge overturned an arbitration
award rendered by an AMEX arbitration panel in a 51h year proceeding and only two
of the five members of the panel were members of the original panel. See Matthew
Goldstein, Change in Arbitrators Voids $1.5 Million Award. N.Y. L.J., Nov. 24, 1995
at 1, "While the substitutions were made in accordance with Stock Exchange guide-
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requirements of background disclosure, as well as the right to chal-
lenge the new panel member.12 0
Section 13 - Initiation of Proceedings
Initially this section set out the requirements for the commence-
ment of an arbitration proceeding by setting out the general plead-
ing and service requirements regarding such items as the Statement
of Claim, Submission Agreement, Answer, Counterclaim and/or
Cross-claims, and Claims over. 121 This section also permitted join-
der and consolidation, which would be initially ruled upon by the
Director of Arbitration, leaving the ultimate decision to the arbi-
tration panel. 122
SICA subsequently tightened this section by permitting arbitra-
tors to bar evidence at a hearing where only a general denial was
pleaded, or where available defenses were not pleaded. 123 The au-
thority to bar evidence at the hearing was further extended to situ-
ations where a party fails to file a timely answer. 124
After McMahon, and largely for purposes of trimming increasing
costs, SICA amended Section 13 to require the parties to serve
upon each other all pleadings after the service of the Statement of
Claim.125 The SROs continue to be responsible for serving the
Statement of Claim. 126 Thereafter, the parties are required to
serve all other parties with any other pleading and file copies with
the Director of Arbitration.127 To facilitate this new procedure,
Section 13(b) specifically permits service by mail or other means of
delivery. 128
After its issuance of the Sixth Report, SICA amended Section
13(d) to its present form. SICA revised subparagraph (1) thereof
to parallel the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)
lines ... the changing makeup of the panel had prolonged the process and 'compro-
mised the ability of the arbitrators to properly assess evidence of this case.'" Id.
120. Id.
121. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-6, A-7.
122. Id. at A-7.
123. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at C-5, C-6; see also Uniform Code of
Arbitration § 13(c)(i), infra Appendix A.
124. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 33-34; see also Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion § 13(c)(2)(iii), infra Appendix A.
125. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 8-9; see also Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion § 13(a), infra Appendix A.
126. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 13(a), infra Appendix A.
127. Id. § 13(c).
128. Id. § 13(b).
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on permissive joinders. 29 SICA also revised subparagraph (2) of
13(d) to clarify that multiple claimants may file together, eliminat-
ing the implication that filings must first be made separately and
then joined; but, as to such jointly filed claims, the Director of Ar-
bitration is authorized to sever such claims. 130  Furthermore,
although SICA retained the Director of Arbitration's right to con-
solidate separately filed claims, the section clearly provides that the
arbitrator(s) shall make all final determinations on these issues.13 1
SICA also studied the complex issues involving class actions in
arbitration and concluded-for a variety of reasons, including the
difficult problem of class determination and notice-that a court
order be a prerequisite for SRO acceptance of a class action matter
for arbitration. 132 Absent such a court order, parties similarly situ-
ated may still avail themselves of the remedies of joinder and con-
solidation provided under this section. 133
Occasionally, a rule slips through SICA which hopefully does not
survive a Rule 19(b) filing. Such a rule was barely approved by
SICA at its January 1994 meeting where Section 13 of the Uniform
Code was amended by adding a new subdivision (a).134 This
amendment (Attachment Rule) was intended to curb the growing
practice of attaching irrelevant, prejudicial and/or extraneous
materials to pleadings. 135
Under the Attachment Rule, if one of the parties objected to an
attachment and the issue could not be resolved by the parties, the
objectionable pleading would be referred to the Director of Arbi-
tration for a ruling on the propriety of the attachments, and would
not be delivered to the arbitrators until the Director's ruling was
complied with. 136 The rule specifically provided, however, that at-
tachments which were redacted could still be offered as evidence at
the hearing subject to the arbitrators' ruling.' 37 Furthermore, the
decision of the Director regarding the attachments in question
129. Id. § 13(d)(1).
130. Id. § 13(d)(2); see also Katsoris V, supra note 87, at 438-39.
131. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 13(d)(3)-(4), infra Appendix A.
132. See SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1989, at 7; see also generally Note, Daniel
R. Waltcher, Classwide Arbitration and 10(b)-5 Claims. in the Wake of Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L.R. 380 (1989). See also supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
133. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 13(d), infra Appendix B.
134. Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1145.
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could not be used by any party to support or oppose the admission
of any disputed document to the arbitrators at the hearing. 138
The Attachment Rule was primarily intended to prevent the ar-
bitrators from being prejudiced by the objectionable material dur-
ing the period between their receiving and reviewing the pleadings
and the actual hearing, since they would see it if later offered sepa-
rately at the hearing. Although the proposal may have had some
merit, we must not lose sight of the basic attributes of arbitration:
speed, economy, and fairness, both in fact and appearance. 139
Thus, the Attachment Rule must be measured against other alter-
natives or consequences that may arise or be considered. First of
all, it would appear that one could easily circumvent the Attach-
ment Rule by simply weaving highlighted excerpts and quotes of
objectionable materials directly into the text of the pleading. Is the
Director or Arbitration next going to be asked to search and de-
stroy portions of the pleading proper? Such a course would hardly
be advisable.
To the greatest extent possible, SROs should not be making sub-
stantive decisions, because their role is intended to be purely ad-
ministrative, and they are still perceived by some, rightly or
wrongly, as being a forum influenced by the securities industry.
Thrusting SRO personnel into motion pleading practice would only
add to their suspicion. These types of decisions are best left to the
panel of arbitrators, the majority of whom are public members. 40
Admittedly, arbitrators could make such decisions before the first
hearing, but even such a procedure would add some delay and ex-
pense to the process.
Moreover, the pleadings are not accepted into evidence until in-
troduced into the record at the first hearing session. Even then,
arbitrators generally do not consider them for the truth or falsity of
their contents, but merely as the pleader's allegations. Accord-
ingly, any objections to such attachments can be expeditiously and
effectively handled at the first hearing session before the arbitra-
tors. In fact, when the pleadings go to the arbitrators, they could
be marked to highlight those attachments which have been ob-
jected to. If arbitrators are incapable of expunging from their
minds excludable evidence, then they should not remain as arbitra-
tors. Moreover, although irrelevant attachments to pleadings are
troublesome, it has been this author's experience that such attach-
138. Id.




ments often have an additional, unintended effect of suggesting a
weakness in the pleader's case.
When the Attachments Rule was presented to SICA at its Janu-
ary 1994 meeting, it was passed by the narrowest of margins. Four
SROs and the SIA voted for the Rule, two SROs abstained, and all
four of the Public Members voted against it.' 4 1 When one further
considers that there are 15 voting members of SICA,'142 and the
Attachments Rule received only five affirmative votes (1/3 of the
overall membership and less than the majority of those present),
with total public opposition, it can safely be said that this controver-
sial rule did not constitute a mandate.
Indeed, the Attachment Rule was not approved by any SRO
board, nor the subject of a Rule 19(b) filing; 43 and, in 1995, SICA
quietly expunged the Attachment Rule from the Uniform Code.1'"
Section 14 - Designation of Time and Place of Hearings
This section initially provided that "[u]nless the law directs
otherwise," the Director of Arbitration determines the time and
place for the initial hearing upon notice of at least eight business
days; thereafter, the arbitrators would determine the time and
place of subsequent hearings. 45
Subsequent to the Sixth Report, however, SICA has amended
Section 14, eliminating the reference "unless the law directs other-
wise. "146 This was done so as to nullify selection of hearing provi-
sions incorporated into brokerage contracts, thus preventing a
member firm from unfairly controlling the selection of a hearing
location, and thereby causing the customer to bear unreasonable
expense to pursue a claim.
Moreover, in September, 1995, SICA extended the notice provi-
sion regarding the first hearing date from eight to its present fifteen
days.
141. Id. at 1147. At its very next meeting, SICA passed a rule requiring that any
rule change could only be effected by at least a majority of those members present at
a meeting.
142. Id.
143. Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA, Does The Bell Toll For Thee?, SEC. ARB. COM-
MENTATOR, Jan. 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Katsoris VI].
144. SICA Meeting of Jan. 27, 1995.
145. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-8. The period for notification was
increased from 8 business days to 15 at SICA's September, 1995 meeting. See Uni-
form Code of Arbitration § 14, infra Appendix A.
146. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 14, infra Appendix A.
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Section 15 - Representation by an Attorney
This section simply intended to provide that all parties have the
right to representation by counsel.147 In 1991, however, SICA be-
gan to receive complaints that claimants were being represented in
SRO arbitrations-not by friends, not by their accountants or busi-
ness associates, not by their relatives-but by professional groups
who were not attorneys (Non-Attorney Representatives, or
NARs).148
For a variety of reasons, SICA initially viewed this as a subject
which could best be handled at the state level, because attorneys
general and bar associations have the principal responsibility for
dealing with questions relating to standards and qualifications to
practice law. 149 Thus, they are better suited to handle this multi-
faceted problem at the local level. But the complaints persisted,
and they raised questions as to whether customers were being ade-
quately represented in SRO arbitrations.150 The AAA has no such
restricting provisions in its arbitration rules dealing with this issue.
Nevertheless, SICA recongnized its obligation to address this
thorny issue. Its motive was to protect the overall interests of the
thousands of claimants using SRO forums annually; and, it did so
by thoroughly examining this issue of representation.
15 1
Because of the enormous stakes and widely divergent opinions,
SICA decided, for the first time in its history, to solicit public com-
ment-like the SEC and other regulatory agencies do prior to
adopting a rule-in order to elicit the views of the public and af-
fected parties.' 52 Accordingly, SICA held two special meetings at
which numerous individuals and organizations appeared-includ-
ing organizations of non-attorney representatives. 53
147. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-8.
148. See Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration On Representa-
tion of Parties In Arbitration by Non-Attorneys, 22 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 503, 505
(1995) [hereinafter NARS Report]; SICA Report on Non-Attorney Representations,
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1995, at 1. See also Regulating Nonlawyers, A.B.A
JOURNAL, Oct. 1995, at 103.
149. NARS Report, supra note 148, at 515.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. An interesting development occurred in a California case, where a NARs
consented to a permanent injunction whereby in essence agreed not to commence any
future arbitration proceedings against the brokerage firm and its employees, Sutro &
Co., Inc., v. Richard L. Sacks, et al., Case No. 965943, (Supreme Ct. of Cal. San Fran-
cisco County, Nov. 17, 1995).
153. NARS Report, supra note 148, at 506. See also Michael Siconolfi, Plan To Bar
Nonlawyer Advisors In Investor Disputes Is Debated, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1993 at A-
U.
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Initially, SICA received unfavorable publicity, because some in
the press came down instinctively on the side of consumerism; that
is, that there should be free access to the system. 154 There were
even suggestions that SICA was controlled by lawyers, and there-
fore its inquiry sought to protect its own. Those innuendos, how-
ever, were unwarranted. 155 On several occasions, this author urged
the press to look at this issue fairly, because it would react quite
differently when some destitute person wrongly lost all of his or
her savings and recovered nothing because of incompetent or un-
ethical representation. 56
Undaunted, SICA listened carefully and examined all of the is-
sues honestly and constructively, and issued its Report of the Secur-
ities Industry Conference on Arbitration on Representation of
Parties in Arbitration by Non-Attorneys (NARS Report). 57 It is
noteworthy that since this Report was issued, the United States
Supreme Court rendered its landmark decision in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,15s which, inter alia, upheld arbitra-
tors' authority to award punitive damages. If nothing else, that de-
cision's recognition of punitive damages heightens the concern as
to the quality and adequacy of claimants' representation.
It is SICA's view that claimants should have broad access to the
SRO arbitration process and a wide choice of representation.' 59 At
the same time, SICA is concerned about the adequacy of such rep-
resentation and its effects upon the integrity of the SRO process.160
As a practical matter, however, because of the large number of
arbitration cases filed throughout the country with the SROs each
year, the SROs are ill-equipped to police or review the quality of
such representation.' 6' Nevertheless, based upon the information
gathered during SICA's investigation, the NARS Report con-
154. Id See also SAC Report on Non-attorney Representation, SEC. ARB. COMMEN-
TATOR, Jan. 1994, at 3-6.
155. NARS Report, supra note 148, at 506.
156. Id. See also Michael Siconolfi, Imperfect Advocate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995,
at Al,
In a seductive pitch to injured investors who distrust lawyers: A firm led by
former broker-not lawyers-will represent you in your brokerage disputes,
pledging low fees and high returns... But a group of IAS clients and former
employees complain that the ... investment recovery firm has instead found
a variety of ways to take them to the cleaners.
Id.
157. NARS Report, supra note 148, at 507-56.
158. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
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cluded that certain activities of NARs may in fact constitute the
unauthorized practice of law.162 SICA further concluded that
claims made by some of the NARs tend to be inaccurate and mis-
leading and, as such, raise questions under state or federal false
advertising statutes or other consumer regulations. 163 Accordingly,
SICA sent its NARS Report to bar associations and attorney li-
censing bodies in the fifty states, the District of Columbia and Pu-
erto Rico.164 SICA also sent its Report to the attorneys general
and/or state regulatory officials with jurisdiction over advertising in
each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
and to the Federal Trade Commission.165
Presently, some states bar NARs from representing parties in ar-
bitration or other forms of alternative dispute resolution as the un-
authorized practice of law.' 66 SICA's NARS Report concluded
that these states should consider some form of regulation of
NARs.167 This regulation should include a form of registration or
licensing of NARs in order to track, maintain, and make available
consumer complaints regarding the conduct of particular NARs.
168
In addition, the NARS Report also recommended that state reg-
ulation of NARs should focus on the areas of concern identified by
the Report, including but not limited to: (1) development and en-
forcement of ethical standards; (2) guidelines with respect to ad-
vertising; and, (3) guidelines for written fee schedules and refund
policies. 169
Finally, SICA amended Section 15 to provide that all parties
have the right to be represented by an attorney (instead of by
counsel, as previously provided), and added that: "Issues regard-
ing the qualifications of a person to represent a party in arbitration
are governed by applicable law and should be determined by an
appropriate court or other regulatory agency. In the absence of a
162. Id. at 524.





168. Id. See also Michael Siconolfi, Imperfect Advocate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995,
at Al,
"Some critics question the competence of nonattorney advisers to deal with
an increasingly complex securities arbitration process. Lawyers complain,
for one thing, about the lack of oversight. 'If we do something wrong, we're
out of here; they [NARs] just move on to the next victim' charges H. Thomas
Fahn, a Los Angeles lawyer."
Id.
169. NARS Report, supra note 148, at 524.
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court order, the arbitration proceeding shall not be stayed or other-
wise delayed pending resolution of such issues.'1 70
Section 16 - Attendance at Hearings
Section 16 provides that except for parties and their attorneys,
the arbitrators decide the attendance or presence of other persons
at the hearings. This Section was modified in 1995 to reflect the
change in Section 15 of the Code, substituting the term "attorney"
for "counsel.' 1
71
Section 17 - Failure to Appear
This section, from its inception, has provided for a hearing to be
held and an award rendered despite the fact that a party fails to
appear at a hearing after due notice was given. 172
Section 18 - Adjournments
Qriginally, Section 18 merely authorized arbitrators to grant ad-
journments.173 Unfortunately, the issue of adjournments became a
chronic problem. A horseback survey at several of the SROs re-
vealed that approximately one-third of the cases heard had their
first hearing date adjourned after the panel has already been ap-
pointed. 174 Furthermore, even this first adjourned date was often
subsequently adjourned one or more additional times before the
first actual hearing was held.
170. SICA Meeting of Sept. 14, 1995.
171. Id.; see also SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-8. SICA amended the Arbi-
trator's Manual, supra note 113, to add thereto a new paragraph dealing with the
"Attendance of Witnesses at the Hearing." See Supplemental Text for the SICA Ar-
bitrator's Manual, SEC ARS. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1989, at 15.
"Arbitrators should consider that expert witnesses often serve an important
role in assisting parties and their counsel in the presentation of their cases,
and also may be asked to testify about what has been said at the hearing in
additional to the facts known to them prior to the hearing. Barring counter-
vailing reasons, expert witnesses who are assisting parties in the presentation
of their cases should be permitted to attend all hearings. Generally, there is
a presumption that expert witnesses, as opposed to witnesses testifying as to
the facts pertinent to the case, will be permitted to attend the entire proceed-
ing." Id.
172. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-8. In such cases, however, the arbi-
trators would be wise to exercise extra caution to ensure that due notice was in fact
given, taking into account all relevant circumstances.
173. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-8.
174. Constantine N. Katsoris, Adjournments, The Arbitration Virus, SEC ARB. COM-
MENTATOR, Jan. 1989, at 2 [hereinafter Katsoris VII].
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Despite the fact that all the parties may have agreed to these
adjournments, they still have a crippling effect on the arbitration
process. Such repeated adjournments often result in having to re-
place arbitrators, who have already cleared the challenge and con-
flict processes, 175 because their schedules cannot accommodate the
new adjourned date or dates. This causes additional delay, because
the SRO staff must then find a replacement arbitrator or arbitra-
tors, who also had to clear the challenge and conflict hurdles de
novo. Moreover, such repeated adjournments discourage many ex-
cellent and qualified arbitrators from serving, either because it re-
sulted in their replacement after having already qualified, or
because of the inconvenience of having to needlessly reserve sev-
eral adjourned dates before the first hearing was held.
Thus, these seemingly harmless adjournments undercut the two
advantages or arbitration: speed and economy. 176 The more ad-
journments granted, the longer resolution was delayed, and the
more expensive it became for the parties and the arbitration forum
in administering the system.
No one suggests that legitimate requests for adjournments
should not be granted. Parties should be given the benefit of the
doubt in this regard. A practice of automatically granting adjourn-
ments merely because both parties consent, however, strains and
undermines the legitimate goal of keeping arbitration speedy, eco-
nomical and fair.177
Before McMahon, SICA addressed this problem by amending
Section 18 to provide that if a party requested an adjournment (af-
ter the arbitrators have already been appointed) and the adjourn-
ment was granted, that party had to pay a fee equal to the initial
deposit of costs, but not to exceed more than $100.178 It became
evident that this penalty was not a sufficient deterrent. Accord-
ingly, after the Sixth Report, SICA replaced what was then subdivi-
sion (b) with a new one providing not only for increased and
escalating fees (up to $1,000), but making them mandatory at the
time of the request, unless waived by the Director of Arbitration. 7
9
The majority of the Public Members of SICA, however, did not
support this latest amendment because it made the increased fee a
175. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration §§ 10, 11, 12, infra Appendix A.
176. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 381.
177. Unnecessary and repeated adjournments can be very disruptive of the sched-
ules and availability of arbitrators, and on the SRO forums themselves.
178. See FIvrH REPORT, supra note 27, at 35.
179. See EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 42, at 16.
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condition precedent (unless waived by the Director) to seeking an
adjournment from the arbitrators. 1 0 Such a pre-condition could
impose a severe hardship on many public claimants, and should be
rescinded. 181
In sum, Section 18 articulates the policy that, to the extent possi-
ble, adjournments be limited to those instances where they are rel-
atively necessary. It would be ironic that after all the effort to
improve the substance and image of securities arbitrations, the vi-
rus of unnecessary adjournments should sap its vitality and
usefulness. 8 2
Section 19 - Acknowledgement of Pleadings
Since the original Code was adopted, Section 19 required the ar-
bitrators to acknowledge, to all parties present, that they have read
the pleadings filed by the parties. 83
Section 20 - General Provisions Governing A Pre-
Hearing Proceeding
The present Section 20 incorporates the provisions of the origi-
nal Code Sections 20 (Subpoena Process) 184 and 21 (Power to Di-
rect Appearances). 85 Under those provisions, the parties were
expected to voluntarily exchange documents as would "serve to ex-
pedite the arbitration.' 8 6 There was, however, no established
mechanism to ensure that parties cooperated in document produc-
tion. Accordingly, some parties did not produce documents until
the day of the hearing. Such practice was patently unfair and often
resulted in trial by ambush. 8 7
180. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 19, infra Appendix A.
b) Unless waived by the Director of Arbitration, a party requesting an ad-
journment after arbitrators have been appointed shall deposit a fee, equal to
the initial deposit of forum fees for the first adjournment and twice the ini-
tial deposit of forum fees, not to exceed $1,000 for a second or subsequent
adjournment requested by that party.
Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, this condition precedent has not been adopted by
the NYSE. See N.Y. Stock Exch R. 617(b), in N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 52617 (1995).
181. See Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1124.
182. Id.
183. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 19, infra Appendix A.
184. See FiFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 35.
185. Id.
186. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration §§ 20(f), 20(g), infra Appendix A.
187. This forced the demanding party into the unenviable choice of proceeding with
the hearing without having an adequate opportunity to examine the produced docu-
ments, or of seeking a delay from arbitrators who had planned to start the hearings on
that day. See also DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES AR1ITRATION PROCEDURE MAN-
SICA
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Under their broad powers, arbitrators have always had the au-
thority to resolve discovery disputes in advance of the hearing.' 88
Indeed, even before McMahon, some SROs forwarded discovery
disputes to arbitrators prior to hearings on the merits, giving the
panel chairman the authority to resolve discovery disputes in ad-
vance of the first hearing.18 9 Some arbitrators, particularly those
who were not attorneys, were reluctant to exercise such powers
without specific authorization in the Uniform Code.
It became apparent after McMahon that the time had arrived to
codify the informal practice of some SROs to get the arbitrators
involved in discovery disputes before the first hearing. Accord-
ingly, in addition to merging the old Sections 20 and 21 into the
present Section 20, SICA added specific provisions relating to pre-
hearing conferences, and procedures for pre-hearing document and
information production. 90
Under the new Section 20, a request for documents or informa-
tion may be served as soon as twenty business days after service of
the Statement of Claim.191 If a party objects or fails to honor a
request, a prehearing conference may be requested to resolve the
impasse; 192 and, in order to eliminate protracted and unnecessary
bickering over the production of documents considered customery
and ordinary, it has recently been suggested that basic lists be cre-
ated of documents that must be produced. 93
Section 20 authorizes a sole arbitrator to act on behalf of the
panel to issue subpoenas and set deadlines for compliance with dis-
covery orders. 194 Prior to the initial hearing date, the present Sec-
tion 20 also requires the parties to exchange the names and
business affiliations of witnesses and the documents that they in-
tend to use in their direct case at least 20 days before the first
scheduled hearing date; and, the production of, or a list of such
documents and witnesses shall also be served on the Director of
UAL (2d ed. 1990). For a suggested list of documents to request, see id. § 9.05 at 9-10
to 9-22.
188. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 372.
189. Id
190. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. See also SICA Adopts Discovery
Rules, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1988, at 1.
191. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 20(b)(1), infra Appendix A.
192. Id § 20(b)(4).
193. See NYSE SyMposIuM, supra note 5, at 1551-61; RUDER REPORT, infra note
307 and accompanying text.
194. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 20(e), infra Appendix A.
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Arbitration.'95 Finally, all parties to a dispute must now receive
copies of any subpoenas issued.' 96
In practice, some of the pre-hearing proceedings are conducted
by conference call. Although this method is cheaper and more
convenient, it is not always productive. In that case, the arbitrator
overseeing the discovery should order a formal face-to-face hear-
ing. The best hope for preventing these procedures from dragging
out and increasing the cost of the proceedings, as often happens in
court litigation, is to have experienced and knowledgeable arbitra-
tors who do not let matters get out of hand. Indeed, in appropriate
cases, sanctions should be considered. 197
Section 20 permits a sole arbitrator selected for these pre-hear-
ing issues to refer any issue to the full panel; and, in the appropri-
ate case, should not hesitate to do so, for many of the issues may
again be revisited later by the entire panel during the hearing.
The Uniform Code omits any reference to pre-hearing deposi-
tions; however, the circumstances under which such depositions
may be ordered by the arbitrators are discussed in the SICA Arbi-
trator's Manual. 198
On the whole, these new pre-hearing procedures enhance the ar-
bitration process. Admittedly, the new procedures under Section
20, which are also addressed in the Arbitrator's Manual, may in-
volve some additional cost and time, but this is more than counter-
balanced by the equitable consideration of preventing undue
surprise and possible prejudice to either party once the hearing on
the merits begins. In fact, the resolution of such disputes before
the first hearing ultimately saves time and expense, and sets the
tone for an orderly hearing.
Section 21 - Evidence
Section 21 provides that the arbitrators determine the material-
ity and admissibility of evidence; and, as a result, shall not be
bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or state evidentiary
195. Id § 20(c).
196. Id § 20(0.
197. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1566. See also ROBINS; supra note
187, at 9-22.
198. See SUPPLEMENTAL TEXT FOR THE SICA ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1989, at 15.
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rules.1 99 Section 21 remains unchanged except that after McMa-
hon, its number was renumbered from 22.200
Section 22 - Interpretation of and Enforcement of
Arbitrator Rulings
Section 22 provides that arbitrators have the final authority to
interpret the provisions of the Code. It remains unchanged except
that after McMahon, its section number was changed from 23 and
it was amended to specifically empower the arbitrators to take ap-
propriate action to obtain compliance with any ruling by the
arbitrators.2 o1
Section 23 - Determinations of Arbitrators
Section 23 provides that the rulings and determinations of the
panel shall be made by a majority of the panel.20 2 Aside from its
section number, which was 24 prior to McMahon, this section re-
mains unchanged from its original version. 20 3
Section 24 - Record of Proceedings
Before McMahon, Section 24 (then numbered 25) did not re-
quire that a record of the arbitration proceeding be kept.2°4 It is
noteworthy that the AAA rules also do not require a record be
kept.205
After McMahon, this section was amended to require that a ver-
batim record, by stenographic reporter or tape recording, of all
proceedings be kept. 0 6 This flexibility as to the method of record-
ing takes into account the significant cost differential between a
stenographic record and a tape recording. Nevertheless, in a multi-
sessioned proceeding spanning over a long period of time, a steno-
graphic record is preferable, because it more easily enables the ar-
bitrators to refresh their recollection of past testimony.
199. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 21, infra Appendix A. But see Gregg Paradise,
Note, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the Use of Arbitration
Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1995), which suggests
that a modified version of the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply in patent arbi-
tration in order to make it more acceptable to patent attorneys.
200. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 10.
201. Id.
202. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 23, infra Appendix A.
203. See SIxTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 10.
204. See FiFrH REPORT, supra note 27, at 36.
205. See Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1126.
206. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
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A record of the proceedings is not a luxury.2 °7 It serves the
needs of an orderly arbitration and the interests of both the parties
and the arbitrators.2 0 8 This is particularly true if the proceedings
are extended over a period of time, or punitive damages are
involved.20 9
Section 25 - Oaths of the Arbitrators and Witnesses
Prior to McMahon, this section was numbered Section 26.210
Otherwise, this section has always provided that the oath or affir-
mation shall be administered to the arbitrators before the first ses-
sion and that all testimony shall be under oath or affirmation.21'
Section 26 - Amendments
In the original Code, this was known as Section 27 and simply
provided that amended pleadings would not be permitted after re-
ceipt of a responsive pleading without the consent of the arbitra-
tors.212 Before McMahon, however, the section was amended by
setting up a procedure for amending pleadings after receipt of a
responsive pleading, but before the appointment of the arbitration
panel.213 The substance of this section has remained intact after
McMahon, except that the present section imposes upon the party
making the change the obligation to serve the new or different
pleading, whereas initially, that burden fell upon the Director of
Arbitration.214
Section 27 - Reopenings of Hearings
Other than changing its number from Section 28 to 27,215 this
section always permitted the reopening of hearings, where permit-
ted by law, by the arbitrators on their own motion, or in the discre-
tion of the arbitrators, upon application of a party at any time
before the award is rendered.216 Although the Code is silent on the
207. See Constantine N. Katsoris, I Won't Sit Without A Record, SEC. ARB. COM-
MENTATOR, Sept. 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Katsoris VIII].
208. Id.
209. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1662.
210. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 36.
211. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
212. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-10.
213. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 32, at C-8.
214. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 11. See also supra notes 124-27 and ac-
companying text.
215. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
216. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-10.
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grounds for such re-opening, they should include such circum-
stances as perjured or coerced testimony.
Section 28 - Awards
Prior to McMahon, this section was numbered 29 and basically
provided: (1) all awards had to be in writing and signed by a ma-
jority of the arbitrators; (2) all awards were deemed final and not
subject to review or appeal except as provided by law; (3) arbitra-
tors should endeavor to render the award within thirty business
days from the date the record was closed; and (4) the means by
which the Director of Arbitration was to serve the award on the
parties. 217
After McMahon, Section 29 was renumbered Section 28, and
was amended to require that the award be made publicly available
and include summary data, such as a description of the issues in
controversy and the amounts claimed and awarded.218 This data is
available to the public by various vendors and in accordance with
the policies of the sponsoring SRO.219
Even with these additional requirements, however, the section
still does not require the arbitrators to issue written opinions,
although they are free to do so. At first blush, this may seem to be a
weakness of the Code, and perhaps to some, a weakness of arbitra-
tion in general.22° The argument is that written opinions should be
required because they would give insight to the parties as to the
rationale for the award. In addition, it would help the parties in
formulating opinions about arbitrators with a view to exercising
their peremptory challenges in the future.
On the other hand, requiring written opinions would certainly
slow down the rendering of awards, since they are often arrived at
on the basis of consensus. 221 For example, if three arbitrators, A, B
and C: (i) initially estimate damages of $10,000, $20,000 and
$30,000, respectively; (ii) ultimately agree on a $20,000 award; and,
(iii) when they write the opinion, arbitrator A bases his award on
unsuitability, arbitrator B on churning, and arbitrator C on unau-
217. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 36-37. In September, 1995, SICA
amended sudivision (c) of section 28 to enable the award to also be served by facimile
transmission or other electronic means.
218. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
219. Id. See Award Report, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1989, at 6-7; see also
Award Report, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1989, at 2-7. Indeed, some awards are
being analyzed and commented upon. Id. at 8-10.




thorized trading. Can arbitrators A, B and C realistically issue a
reasoned award for $20,000, even though they totally disagree on
the reasons? Moreover, would they?
Nor would opinions necessarily enhance the cause of fairness.222
Indeed, requiring such opinions might even result in fewer awards
in favor of claimants on general equity grounds.223 It would also
put additional pressure on the already strained SRO staffs while
drafts of written opinions are circulated and recirculated among
the various arbitrators for corrections, redrafts, and finalization.224
In addition, it is submitted that instead of being a window into
the rationale of arbitrators, a written opinion will be used as a plat-
form and blueprint for many more appeals, because it identifies or
magnifies targets, meaningful or otherwise, for the losing party to
attack. Such appeals are both costly and time consuming and ulti-
mately result in undue delay in the payment of any award.225
222. ld. at 383.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited. Arthur
Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB. J. 63, § 6.03 (1965).
"If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitra-
tors, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for
error, either in law or fact." Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). In fact, the
typical grounds for vacating an arbitration award are surprisingly uniform throughout
the United States; namely:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an arbitrator and a party
or his counsel affecting the arbitrator's impartiality or appearance of
impartiality.
(2) An arbitrator was corrupt.
(3) The arbitrators did not schedule or conduct the hearing in a fair and
judicious manner.
(4) The arbitrators granted relief that they were not authorized to grant
under the contract pursuant to which the arbitration was held.
See Goldberg, supra, § 6.03 at 63; see also The United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 10 (1982); see also B. N. Smiley, Stockbroker-Customer Disputes: Making a Case
For Arbitration, 23 GEORGIA STATE BAR J 195 (1987).
The greatest advantage of arbitration is that awards are almost irreversible.
This is perhaps its greatest peril as well ... An award which has a legal or
factual basis which may be rationally inferred from the evidence will be up-
held. Arbitration awards will not be set aside for a mistake of law unless the
arbitrators have acted in 'manifest disregard' of the law.
Id. at 200 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For an award to be vacated on this
ground, "[t]he error must have been ... readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator." Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Michael P. O'Mullan, Seeking Con-
sistency in Judicial Review of Securities Arbitration; An Analysis of the Manifest Disre-
gard of the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 121 (1995).
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The one area, however, where such an appeal may be advisable
is in the case of punitive damages, because of its unusual nature.226
In this regard, it would appear that specific findings explaining the
basis of the award of punitive damages is desirable, so that the of-
fending party and an appellate court can better understand the ra-
tionale behind the unusual punishment being meted out.227
Moreover, undue delay in the payment of an award is particu-
larly injurious to the small investor, who may have an immediate
need for the money. Indeed, SICA was concerned that some bro-
kers unduly delayed payment of awards issued against them. Ac-
cordingly, after the Sixth Report, Section 28 was further amended
to specifically provide for the accrual of interest and that all mone-
tary awards shall be paid within thirty (30) days of receipt unless a
motion to vacate has been filed with a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 2 8 At one point, SICA also considered the inclusion of a bond
or escrow requirement in the Uniform Code to insure such prompt
payment,2 2 9 but abandoned the idea because it was unduly burden-
some; instead, SICA merely relied on the aforementioned thirty
day rule.230 This payment requirement is a distinct advantage over
court-litigated awards or those issued at the AAA, which lacks dis-
ciplinary authority over the broker/dealer.2 31
Finally, in 1992, a new subdivision (h) was added to the Uniform
Code which provided that arbitrators may grant any remedy or re-
lief that the arbitrators deem just and equitable and that would
have been available in a court with jurisdiction over the matter.232
This amendment was intended to strengthen the hand of arbitra-
226. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages In Securities Arbitration; The
Tower of Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 573 (1991) [hereinafter Katsoris
IX].
227. Id.
228. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 28(g), (h), infra Appendix A; see also 2
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1989, at 12.
229. A stricter 20 day rule with an escrow provision was, however, approved by the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. See § 31 MSRB Rules of Arbitration, re-
printed in ARBITRATION INFORMATION & RULES, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAK-
ING BOOK 30 (1989), at 30.
230. Id.
231. The NASD, however, adopted an amendment to include the AAA in its reso-
lution authorizing discipline for non-payment of an award. See NASD 19-b-4 Pro-
posed Rule Change, File No. SR-NASD-89-47, Amendment No. 1 at 12. The NYSE
adopted a similar amendment to its Rule 637 on September 13, 1995.
232. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Mastrobuono Not The Last Word On Punitives,
13 ALTERNATIVES 144, 145 (Nov. 1995)[hereinafter Katsoris X]. See also RUDER RE-
PORT, infra note 307 and accompanying text; Joel M. Leifer & Daniel Hume, Recent
Court Decisions Affecting Arbitration, Sept./Oct, Nat. Soc. Compliance Professionals
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tors in awarding punitive damages in response to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's opinion in Fahnstock v. Walt-
man,233 which noted that the NYSE Arbitration Rules did not con-
tain such specific authority, whereas such language is contained in
the AAA rules.234 Unfortunately, no SRO board has approved this
change, no doubt due to the strong lobbying by the SIA.235
Section 29 - Agreement to Arbitrate
This section (previously numbered 30 and captioned "Miscella-
neous") 236 was renumbered 29 after McMahon, but has remained
virtually unchanged since its inception.237 It simply incorporates
the Code by reference into every duly executed Submission Agree-
ment, which shall be binding on all parties.238 After the Sixth Re-
port, however, SICA amended Section 29, changing the title from
"Miscellaneous" to "Agreement to Arbitrate," and also extending
the automatic incorporation of the Code to agreements to arbi-
trate.239 Thus, the present section ensures that a party who does
not sign a Submission Agreement is nevertheless still bound by the
provisions of the Uniform Code.24°
Section 30 - Schedule of Fees
Section 30 (previously numbered 31)241 set forth the schedule of
fees for arbitration. These fees have varied and increased since the
original Code. After McMahon, the section was amended to spe-
cifically define a hearing session.242 In addition, the section now
allows the arbitrators to award additional costs beyond hearing ses-
sion costs in their decisions.243 After the Sixth Report, SICA fur-
ther amended Section 30 by modifying the fee schedule and
incorporating a non-refundable filing fee as well as providing for
hearing session deposits.2 "
233. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
234. Id. at 519; see also Katsoris IX, supra note 226, at 584.
235. See Katsoris X, supra note 232.
236. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 36, at A-11.
237. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
238. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 36-37.
239. See SIxT REPORT, supra note 20, at 11; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 29, infra Appendix A.
240. Id
241. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 27, at 37-38.
242. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 11-12.
243. Id
244. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 30(e), infra Appendix A.
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Section 31 - Requirements When Using Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements With Customers
This section is a direct response to the McMahon decision, and
was intended to insure that customers are aware and understand
the effect of signing an agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clause.245 It provides that pre-dispute arbitration agreements
with customers must be highlighted and immediately preceded by
certain disclosure language that describes arbitration and its ef-
fect. 246 The impetus behind this addition was legislative pressure
seeking to render unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 247
The SICA rule also provides that immediately preceding the sig-
nature line there shall be a statement, which shall be highlighted
and separately initialed by the customer, that the agreement con-
tains a pre-dispute arbitration clause.248 Despite its approval by
SICA, no SRO has incorporated this separate initialing require-
ment into their arbitration rules.249 This is regrettable, because
from the point of view of both the customer and the broker, sepa-
rate initialing would more clearly call the arbitration clause to the
customer's attention. Moreover, an initialing requirement would
likely reduce the need for litigation based upon the customer's al-
leged lack of awareness of the clause.
Furthermore, in order to prevent the insertion of restrictive
clauses in customers' agreements which would conflict with the
provisions of the Code, Section 31 also specifically prohibits condi-
tions that limit or contradict the rules of the SROs, or limit the ability
of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limit the ability of the
arbitrators to make any award.250
Since Section 31 was inserted after McMahon, it includes a
grandfather clause, which provides that the requirements of the
section will apply only to new agreements signed, by an existing or
245. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 12.
246. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 31(a), infra Appendix A.
247. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; see also HOBLIN, supra note 1, at
52-57 (Supp. 1988). California had proposed a statute that would restrict arbitration
(McCorguodale Committee), and that Committee agreed that if SICA adopted disclo-
sure rules comparable to theirs, they would withdraw the proposal. Id. Since SICA
did adopt the disclosure rules, the proposal was presumably withdrawn. Id. See also
Carroll E. Nessermann & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of Securities Arbitration, in 1
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1995, at 135, 164-66 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac. Course Hand-
book Series No. B-899, 1995).
248. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 12.
249. For a comparison of different SRO rules, see Katsoris V, supra note 87, at 452-
54. See also infra Appendix B.
250. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 12.
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new customer, after one year has elapsed from the date of SEC
approval to the rule (September, 1989).251 Thus, a broker-dealer
who thereafter attempts to contractually limit an arbitrator's au-
thority to award punitive damages, or a customer's right to select
any of the available SROs, may be subject to disciplinary action by
any SRO that has adopted Section 31, of which it is a member. 2
Recently, both the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange
issued joint notices [Information Memo/Notice to Members 95-16]
to their members that they may not include or seek to enforce pro-
visions in customer agreements which can be construed as restrict-
ing or limiting the ability of customers to arbitrate or arbitrators'
powers to issue awards.253 The language of Section 31(d) is clear.
If the industry somehow sidesteps the rule and continues to load
agreements with provisions that strip investors of their rights in ar-
bitration, the courts must revisit the argument that they are con-
tracts of adhesion, unconscionable and unenforceable.254
HI. The SRO Codes
A. Racing the Uniform Code
The Uniform Code of Arbitration represents a major step in the
development of securities arbitration as a fair, economical and ex-
peditious dispute resolution process. It also represents a significant
effort to make the securities arbitration rules of the various SROs
uniform throughout the country.
A chart which generally tracks the Uniform Code provisions into
the separate Rule or Code sections of the various SROs is attached
to this Article as Appendix C.255 It should be noted, however, that
once SICA adopts a new rule, each SRO generally goes back to
their respective organization for Board approval; and, if successful,
such rule is usually then submitted to the SEC for approval in a
251. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 31(5), infra Appendix A.
252. For an example of such disciplinary authority, see NASD Code of Procedures,
Art. IV, § 1, in NASD MANUAL, (CCH) 3049, at 3151 (1995).
253. See Katsoris X, supra note 231; see also NTM95-16 Update, 7 SEC ARB. COM-
MENTATOR, July 1995, at 10; NTM 95-85: NASD and NYSE Issue Joint Memo, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, Dec. 1995, at 9-10, 15. NTM 95-85 seeks to clarify in a uniform
way the views of the two SROs on questions raised as a result of the issuance of NTM
95-16. Id.
254. See Katsoris X, supra note 232;. See also Mandatory Labor Arbitration Takes
a Hit, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996 at 13; Thorn Weidlich, JAMS Disavows Mandatory
Labor Arbs., THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 1996 at A6.
255. See infra Appendix C.
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Rule 19(b) filing." 6 Accordingly, there is often a time lag between
SICA's approval and SRO action, with the result that the SRO
codes do not always mirror the SICA Code.257
Unfortunately, not all sections of the Code have been adopted
by the SROs. For example, no SRO code has adopted the SICA
requirement that the predispute arbitration clause be separately in-
itialed. 8 Similarly, no SRO has yet adopted SICA's rule, adopted
over four years ago, that arbitrators may grant "any relief they
deem just and equitable. ' '259
These examples of inaction are unfortunate, because they under-
mine the efforts of SICA in achieving a level playing field. Even
worse, however, is when SROs affirmatively by-pass SICA, and
pursue significant rule changes on their own.260 This is particularly
unfortunate since through its public members, together with the
SEC's oversight role of the SROs, SICA appears to be the mecha-
nism with which most of the public seems comfortable. There are
areas, however, where variations among the SRO codes and prac-
tices are understandable.2 6' Moreover, the SROs should be al-
lowed the flexibility to offer optional programs that fit the needs of
their members, for example, regarding: (i) large and complex cases;
and (ii) mediation.
B. Large and Complex Cases
Although the Uniform Code does not specifically deal with large
and complex cases, SICA revised its Procedures Booklet to de-
scribe some additional services that are available at various SROs
to deal with such cases, including: requests for findings of facts and
conclusions of law, expedited hearings, the appointment of arbitra-
tors with special qualifications, and block-scheduling of hearing
256. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 364. Under § 19(b) of the 1934 Act, each
self-regulatory organization shall file with the SEC any proposed rule or change in the
rules of such self-regulatory organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). Moreover, no such "proposed rule change shall take effect unless approved by
the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance with the provisions of this sub-
section. Id.
257. Id
258. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 31, infra Appendix A; see SEVENTH REPORT,
supra note 41, at 23. See also supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
259. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 28(h), infra Appendix A; see NYSE SYMPO-
SIUM, supra note 5, at 1573. See also supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
261. See variations in the manner of the verbatim recording of the arbitration pro-
ceedings, supra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
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dates. Parties seeking such special or additional services should ad-
vise the sponsoring SRO at the earliest time possible.262
C. Mediation
Mediation provides parties with a voluntary, non-adversarial,
and informal process that can often result in a resolution of a dis-
pute with a minimal expenditure of time and money.263 It is a vol-
untary process in which parties present their position to a neutral
third party, a mediator, in an attempt to reach a mutually accepta-
ble resolution of their dispute.264 Mediation is voluntary, and thus
the parties are free to withdraw from mediation at any time.265
Mediation differs from arbitration in several ways. Unlike arbi-
tration, mediation usually is non-binding. 266 Furthermore, a medi-
ator cannot force parties to settle their dispute.267 If the parties
cannot reach a resolution of their dispute through mediation, they
may proceed either in arbitration or in court.268 Mediation is also
usually less formal and less expensive than arbitration and attempts
to assist the parties in reaching an acceptable resolution of their
dispute.269
A mediator can help parties focus on their dispute and better
define the issues that need to be resolved. When parties attempt to
settle disputes on their own, they often lose sight of the real issues
in dispute as personal feelings, hostile attitudes, and misunder-
standings get in the way.27° A mediator can also help the parties by
giving an unbiased view of the case, and by discussing with each
party the merits, or lack thereof, of his or her position. Finally, a
262. See NASD Code § 46, which provides for procedings for large and complex
cases. See also NASD Proposal for Large Arbitrations Would Let Parties Decide
Panel's Pay, 25 SEC. REG. & L. REP (BNA) 1662 (Dec. 10, 1993); Masucci & Cle-
mente, supra note 1, at 331-35.
263. See J. Boyd Page et. al., The Role of Mediation and Early Evaluation in Facili-
tating Settlement Negotiations, in 2 SECURITIEs ARBITRATION 1995, at 60 (PLI Corp.





268. Page, et. aL, supra note 263, at 61.
269. Il; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and
Evolution in the United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 94
(1996).
270. Page, et. al., supra note 263, at 61.
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mediator can be a source of creative resolutions to the problem
that the parties may never had thought of on their own.27'
The NASD has already begun a mediation program in securities
arbitrations. 72 Once the parties agree to mediate their securities
dispute, they will sign a Submission Agreement in which they agree
to abide by the NASD's mediation rules.273 At that point, the
NASD will endeavor to find a mediator acceptable to both parties,
and will also work with the parties to schedule mediation hearings
at a time and place acceptable to all parties and the mediator.274
An important and effective technique used by mediators in the
NASD program is the private "caucus" procedure whereby the me-
diator talks with each party separately about the dispute. 75 Every-
thing that is said between a party and the mediator in a caucus is
completely confidential in order to encourage each party to be very
candid and forthright about his or her case.276 Nothing that is said
to the mediator in a private caucus will be revealed, unless the
party disclosing the information gives the mediator permission to
disclose it.
277
Although most of its members philosophically favor mediation,
SICA does not specifically provide for mediation in its Uniform
Code because it is a voluntary procedure which preceeds arbitra-
tion. The AAA also offers mediation as an alternative to arbitra-
tion and has recently launched a program to provide it as an
alternative in arbitration cases at the PHLX.278
271. Id. See also Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Endorsed by AAA,
ABA and SPIDR, 6 WORLD ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION REPORT No. 10 at 215
(Oct. 1995).
272. See Page, et. al., supra note 263, at 62. See also Katsoris V, supra note 87, at
476 n.415; Getting Serious About Mediation, An Interview with Kenneth L. An-
drichik, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Dec. 1995, at 9-10; A Great Beginning For NASD
Mediation Program, THE NATIONAL CORNER, Dec. 1995, at 1.
273. See Page, et. al., supra note 263, at 62. Failure to honor settlement agreements
in arbitration and mediation consitiutes a violation of the NASD Rules of Fair Prac-
tice, see SR-NASD 95-20, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Dec. 1995, at 9-10, 18.
274. See Page, et. al., supra note 263, at 62.
275. Id. at 63.
276. Id.
277. According to the NASD's mediation rules, and by legislation in several states,
any information disclosed to the mediator in confidence is not admissible in any re-
lated court or arbitration proceeding. See also Margaret A. Jacobs, Case to Test Con-
fidentiality of Mediations: Wall Street May Get a Green Light to Abuse Investors,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1995, at B16.
278. See Advanced Arbitrator Training Offered, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 27,
1992, at 2.
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IV. The Role of the AAA.
In the aftermath of the McMahon decision, most unsettled dis-
putes between a public customer and his broker are resolved in
arbitration.279 In 1993, over 6,500 of such arbitration cases were
filed with the participating SROs, 280 and over 600 were also filed
with the AAA.281 In 1994 the AAA filings dropped to 274282, and
rebounded in 1995 to 332.283
The AAA is a not-for-profit organization offering a broad range
of dispute resolution services throughout the United States.284 Un-
like the SRO forums, however, the AAA is not under the SEC's
regulatory authority. Partly because of this independence from
regulatory supervision, most arbitration clauses in customers'
agreements provided only for arbitration before one or more SRO
forums.285 Adding the AAA as a forum in arbitration agreements
was one of the SEC's recommendations in its September 10, 1987
letter to SICA.286 Moreover, at the behest of the SEC and SICA,
the SIA asked member broker-dealers to consider including the
AAA as an alternative forum in customers' agreements;287 and, the
SIA also included the AAA in its model customers' agreement.288
From the SEC's point of view, the AAA option provides con-
structive competition for the SROs; and, the AAA acts as a "safety
valve" in the event of any backlogging at the SRO forums.289 For
the SIA, the AAA alternative deflects the contention that the pub-
lic is being forced into an industry sponsored SRO forum, and thus
enhances the image of fairness of the arbitration process. 290 From
the perspective of public investors, the AAA option is an alterna-
tive which should exist as a matter of right.291
279. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 368-369.
280. See EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 42, at 29.
281. See AAA Securities Case Filings Down Markedly From 1993 High, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1995, at 7.
282. See AAA Arbitration Filings Finish CY 1995 up 21%, SEC. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR, Feb. 1996, at 7.
283. Id.
284. See Edward W. Morris, Arbitration At The New York Stock Exchange, SECURI-
TIES ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES SEMINAR 114 (Nov. 17, 1989).




289. Id. See also Ryder, The Year in Review, 1989 Securities Arbitration Practice
and Procedure, Sec. Arb. Commentator, Month 1988, at 41, 43.
290. See Katsoris V, supra note 87, at 470.
291. " 'If you can't give customers a choice of litigation or arbitration, at least give
them the choice of a neutral forum,' grumbled Robert Dyer, an attorney in Orlando,
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In spite of the considerable interest in the AAA as an alternative
forum, the securities industry continues to resist its use.292 Even
when the parties' have not inserted the AAA into an arbitration
clause, however, securities cases may find their way into AAA ar-
bitration through the so-called "AmEx window. 293
The name "AmEx window" describes the process through which
the American Stock Exchange (ASE) provides a potential "win-
dow" for investors to'arbitrate before the AAA.294 The ASE Con-
stitution provides that a customer may arbitrate with a member
organization before the AAA in the City of New York, "unless the
customer has expressly agreed, in writing, to submit only to the
arbitration procedures of the Exchange" (waiver provision).295
Thus, unless the waiver provision applied, claimants wishing to util-
ize the AAA could seek to do so despite having signed -an arbitra-
tion agreement that does not provide for AAA as a forum of
choice.296
The unfortunate use of the term "Exchange" in the waiver provi-
sion, however, has led to confusion as to how open the AmEx win-
dow is.297 If the customer is deemed to have waived his right to
AAA arbitration only if he agreed to be bound solely by ASE arbi-
tration procedures, then the "window" is wide open, because few
agreements are so restrictive; thus, the customer would have the
option to pursue arbitration before the AAA. On the other hand,
if the term "Exchange," as used in the waiver provision, includes
other exchanges or SROs (as is usually the case), the opposite re-
sult is likely to occur. In that case, the "window" is barely open,
and only in a few instances will the arbitration end up before the
AAA. Which interpretation would prevail was far from certain,
because lower court decisions were split on the subject.2 98
Fla." Diana B. Henriques, When Naivete Meets Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989,
§ 3, at 1.
292. See Ryder, supra note 289, at 43. As noted above, few broker-dealer firms
presently include the AAA in their pre-dispute agreements. Id. See also Draft Bill to
Restrict Use of Pre-Dispute Agreements, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1988, at 4.
293. See Ryder, supra note 289, at 42.
294. Id.; see also ASE Rule Mandates AAA Arbitration, SEc. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR, May, 1988, at 3.
295. See ASE CONSTITUTION ART. VIII, § 2 (emphasis added).
296. See Ryder, supra note 289, at 43.
297. Id. "The AmEx Window cases are the.., most numerous representatives of a
new litigation genre .... ." Id.
298. See AmEx Window A Foggy Outlook, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Mar. 1989,
at 6; see also "Amex Window"; Shutting Down?, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June
1989, at 4. But see Cowen & Company v. Jeffrey Anderson, 558 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990).
The ASE attempted to clarify the issue by amending its Consti-
tution by replacing the word "Exchange" with the words securities
industry self-regulatory organizations.299 Such a change would have
the effect of closing the AmEx window because it would expand
the application of the waiver provision. This amendment, however,
was recently withdrawn by the ASE. °°
In the end, only time will tell whether the AAA will garner a
larger share of securities arbitration. 30 1 The fate of securities arbi-
tration before the AAA depends on many factors. The fact that
the AAA does not have a Six Year Rule seems to have further
curbed any industry appetite for the AAA option.3 °2 Moreover, it
appears that AAA costs are generally higher than those at SRO
arbitrations. °3 Furthermore, just as some of the public is suspi-
cious of SRO arbitration, some in the securities industry are
equally leery about AAA arbitration. In time, however, the deter-
mining factor may ultimately be the perceptions of public
investors.
V. Contemporary Issues: the NYSE Symposium and the
Ruder Report
As SRO arbitration filings exploded and the issues became more
complex, the rules of combat necessarily became more litigious and
complaints surfaced that securities arbitration had lost its way and
was becoming less economical and speedy and more like the court-
house it was designed to avoid.
299. See When Naivete Meets Wall Street, supra note 296; Amex Moves To Close
Arbitration 'Window', INVESTOR'S DAILY, Dec. 19, 1989, at 1; see also Wall Street's
Arbitration System; Friend or Foe?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1989, § 3, at 12 (letters to
editor by Kenneth R. Leibler & Theodore G. Eppenstein).
300. See AMEX Withdrew Proposal "Window" Amendments After Almost Five
Years at SEC, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1995, at 7. See also Robert Dyer, The
AMEX Window, the SEC Won't Let It Be Shut!, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept.
1995, at 1; Paul J. Dubow, The AMEX Window, Is it Shut Properly?, SEC. ARB. COM-
MENTATOR, Feb. 1996, at 1.
301. See AAA Securities Case Filings Down Markedly From 1993 High, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1995, at 7. In 1993 the AAA reported 635 securities cases filed,
274 for 1994 and 163 for the first half of 1995. Id. See also Friedman & Peterson,
supra note 87, at 555.
302. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. See also Friedman & Peterson,
supra note 87, at 570.
303. See Morris, supra note 284, at 113-14. Moreover, unlike SRO arbitration the
parties in AAA arbitrations pay the arbitrator's fees and other expenses incurred by
the arbitrators or the AAA's representatives, thus making AAA arbitration even
costlier than SRO proceedings. See Friedman & Peterson, supra note 86, at 562-63.
See also Tactical Tip - AAA Arbitrator Compensation, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
June 1995, at 6.
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In 1994, both the NYSE and the NASD announced plans to ad-
dress the troublesome issues facing SRO arbitrations. The NYSE
held a two-day symposium where these issues were openly debated
by a wide spectrum of leading experts in the field and, based upon
such discussions, issued recommendations last year in the form of a
Report.3°4
The NASD sought to calm the troubled waters in a different
way. In the Fall of 1994, the NASD announced the formation of an
Arbitration Task Force to explore and propose broad reforms to
the NASD arbitration process. The Task Force was headed by Pro-
fessor David S. Ruder, former Chairman of the SEC, and included
practitioners and academics with strong backgrounds in arbitra-
tion, business and public interest law.3"5 The Task Force's mission
was to study the factors impacting the arbitration process with a
view to improving its efficiency and trimming its costs. Numerous
closed sessions were held at which various witnesses appeared; in-
cluding the Public Members of SICA.3 °6 Basically, the same sub-
jects were delved into by the Task Force as were discussed at the
NYSE Symposium and in the NYSE Report that followed.
In January of this year, the NASD Task Force issued the Ruder
Report,30 7 which was over 150 pages in length and contained scores
of recommendations. An article such as this, however, can only
address the highlights of the Report's suggestions, namely:
a) Placing a cap on punitive damages of two times compensa-
tion damages, up to a maximum of $750,000;308
b) Changing the method of selecting arbitrators from the
present method, where the forum selects the panel, to one in
which the parties themselves choose the arbitrators from sup-
plied lists;
30 9
304. See NYSE REPORT, supra note 5.
305. See Michael Siconolfi, Revised Rules Are Mapped For Securities Arbitration,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995, at C1. "Members of the task force represent a cross-
section of arbitration specialists, including Steve Hammerman, Vice Chairman at
Merrill Lynch & Co.; J. Boyd Page of Page & Bacek, an Atlanta law firm representing
investors; Frank Spalding, former Chairman of the NASD's National Arbitration
Committee, and John Bachmann, managing principal at Edward D. Jones & Co." Id.
In addition, Linda D. Feinberg, Stephen J. Friedman, & Professor Richard E. Speidel
were also members of the Task Force.
306. James Beckley, Peter Cella, Justin Klein and the author, the then Public Mem-
bers of SICA, appeared before the Ruder Task Force on January 16, 1995.
307. See SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POL-
icy TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECUR-
ITIES DEALERS, INC.(Jan. 1996)[hereinafter RUDER REPORT].
308. Id. at 35-45.
309. Id. at 93-97.
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c) Establishing mandatory lists of discoverable items;31°
d) Eliminating of the present so-called "Six Year Rule" which
automatically bars consideration of a claim if more than six
years have elapsed;311 and,
e) Increasing forum resources and exploring the possibility
that all SRO arbitrations be collapsed into one forum under the
umbrella of the NASD.3 12
a.) Cap on Punitive Damages
The Ruder Report suggests that punitive damages should be lim-
ited to two times compensatory damages or $750,000, whichever is
less.313 Interestingly, the recent reform bill enacted in Congress re-
garding product liability suits seeks to impose a punitive damage
cap of $250,000 or two times compensatory damages, whichever is
greater.314
As for the overall cap of $750,000, it should be rejected out of
hand, because it is totally inadequate in situations involving large
compensatory awards. It condones unconscionable conduct in
large cases by placing an arbitrary ceiling which is not commensu-
rate with the wrong committed (i.e., $10 million compensatory
award) and sends the wrong message to the offending party. Inter-
estingly, on page 43 of the Report, the Task Force justifies its two-
tiered cap on the ground that it "will protect broker-dealers from
'runaway' awards that have no relationship to compensatory dam-
ages." Indeed, what relationship does a $750,000 punitive damage
limit have to a $10 million compensatory award?
As for a cap based upon a multiple of compensatory damages,
there is no such limitation generally imposed in court. Presently,
the principal limitation to punitive awards issued in court is that
they don't offend constitutional sensibilities.31 5 In this regard, a
punitive damage award that was 526 times compensatory damages
was not considered offensive in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
310. Id. at 77-87.
311. Id at 22-33.
312. RUDER REPORT, supra note 307, at 138-56.
313. Id. at 42.
314. See Neil A. Lewis, Democract is Disputing President on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1996, at D23; see also Richard B. Schmitt, As Clinton Vows to Veto Products-
Liability Bill, Some Ask if He's Too Beholdern to Trial Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
1996, at A14.
315. See Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Resources Corp.3 16 Accordingly, claimants will generally oppose a
punitive damage limit of two times compensatory damages.
Yet, similar overall treble damage provisions already exist under
the Clayton Act, RICO claims, or under the Futures Trading Prac-
tices Act.317 Whether treble damages or some higher multiple is
preferable is, in my judgment, negotiable. Such a multiple cap,
however, is a step in the right direction if it is part of an overall
tradeoff which categorically prohibits the waiver of such damages
in pre-dispute arbitration agreements through the insertion of re-
strictive clauses. 318
Moreover, the Ruder Report suggests that arbitrators be prohib-
ited from awarding both RICO damages and punitive damages for
the same claim. I encouraged such a trade-off several years ago as
part of an overall settlement of this issue.319 Interestingly, the Task
Force does not suggest an overall $750,000 cap should a RICO
award be granted.
The NASD is to be commended for attempting to broker a com-
promise in this difficult area; however, for the reasons previously
expressed the overall $750,000 ceiling is simply not acceptable to
the public. 320 To impose an arbitrary cap on punitive damages in
arbitration which bears no relationship to the injury inflicted and
which is not similarly imposed in court would relegate arbitration
to the status of a second class forum, a result never intended by
McMahon. Indeed, the "way arbitration was sold to both the
Supreme Court and the SEC was that essentially you have the
same rights in arbitration as you would have in court. '" 321 More-
over, limitations "on what arbitrators can do that are not parallel
to what judges can do would be hostile to arbitration as a full alter-
native dispute resolution system. '322
If a compromise cannot be reached, however, then perhaps puni-
tive damage claims of over $750,000, or for that matter all punitive
claims, should be removed from arbitration and returned to the
316. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
317. See Katsoris IX, supra note 226, at 582.
318. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Ruder Report is a Delicate Compromise, 14 AL-
TERNATIVES 29, (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter Katsoris XI].
319. See Katsoris IX, supra note 226, at 597-602.
320. See Richard C. Reuben, Investors Find Task Force Report Faulty, A.B.A.
JOURNAL, Apr. 1996, at 40; see also SIA Asks NASD to Delay Implementation of Four
Arbitration Panel Recommendations, SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW REPORT, Apr.
5, 1996, at 471.
321. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1523.
322. Id. at 1532.
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courts where the procedural safeguard of an appeal is more readily
available.
b.) Selection of Arbitrators
At present, the SROs select the arbitrators, giving each side one
peremptory challenge, and an unlimited number of challenges for
323cause. The suggested change in the Ruder Report basically
adopts the AAA system whereby that forum supplies the parties
with lists from which the parties select a panel by.striking out those
unacceptable to them.324
Although the suggested change does not necessarily result in the
appointment of a better qualified panel, it seems attractive to let
the parties pick their own panel. Accordingly, this author does not
oppose the suggested change; however, to see how it works, per-
haps the new system might first be considered on a pilot basis, for
example in certain types of cases (i.e., employment related cases),
or in all cases, but on a regional basis. It might be that this system
is not suitable in a geographical area where not too many qualified
arbitrators reside and most are struck from the list by one or both
parties. This might result in shifting the arbitration to another lo-
cale which might not be as convenient for the claimant.'
c.) Mandatory Lists of Discoverable Items
Discovery controversies are beginning to sap the vitality of the
SRO arbitration process. Often those controversies are unneces-
sary and represent posturing on the part of either or both parties.
Such mandatory lists have been discussed before and are worth ex-
ploring because they will eliminate, in most instances, unnecessary
delay and expense. 325 On the other hand, they should only be pre-
sumptively required, for we should never strip the arbitrators of
the ultimate authority to determine what is discoverable, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the case.
d.) Elimination of Six-Year Rule
As previously discussed, this rule of administrative convenience
has been turned on its head.326 Some courts have misinterpreted
SICA's rule and held that if the six-year period has elapsed, and
323. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
325. See NYSE SyMposIuM, supra note 5, at 1551-61.
326. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
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thus the claim is ineligible for arbitration, it is extinguished.327
Other courts have ruled that the issue of eligibility should first be
decided by the courts and not the arbitrators themselves.32 8 Thus,
this simple Six Year Rule has wreaked havoc on claimants by sub-
jecting them to unnecessary delay, expense, and prejudice. This
author has called for its elimination by SICA for several years now
and applauds the Ruder Report's basic conclusion that it be
eliminated. 32 9
Unfortunately, the recommended elimination of this trouble-
some rule seems dependent upon approval of a potpouri of condi-
tions that could, in the aggregate, be more burdensome than the six
year rule itself, namely: (i) a demand that arbitrators be required to
apply the law of statutes of limitation; (ii) that arbitrators write
reasoned discussions on statute of limitation issues; (iii) the imposi-
tion of an elaborate early deposition motion practice on statute of
limitation issues which could be used to harass investors; and (iv)
encouraging that these motions be decided on the papers. 330 If
such a trade-off is insisted upon, then perhaps it would be advisable
to leave the six year rule intact and revisit subdivisions (b) and (c)
of Section 4 of the Uniform Code with a view toward defining
more sharply when a claim is ineligible for SRO arbitration; and, if
it is not so eligible, that the claimant is entitled to pursue his rem-
edy elsewhere as if there were no agreement to arbitrate.331
e.) Increased Resources and a Single Forum
The Ruder Report suggests that: (a) the NASD Arbitration De-
partment receive whatever resources are necessary to manage
caseload growth and to implement the Report's recommendations,
(b) such increased expenditures should be borne primarily by the
NASD and its member firms, and (c) that the arbitration function
be administered as independently as is practicable.332 All of these
suggestions are commendable and applicable to all the SROs, not
just the NASD. Indeed, for years, the Public Members of SICA
have pressed for those goals at SICA, with the SEC, and more re-
cently, when they appeared before the Task Force. Even the fairest
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1539-40.
330. See RUDER REPORT, supra note 307, at App. 4, at 8-9.
331. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
332. See RUDER REPORT, supra note 307, at 143-45.
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rules will not guarantee fairness if funding for implementation is
inadequate.
The Task Force also recommended that consideration be given
to the establishment of a single forum within an existing SRO,333
and this topic will be covered in the next section.334
The Ruder Report represents a welcome insight into the
problems facing securities arbitration and, together with the con-
clusions proposed by the NYSE Report issued last year,335 repre-
sent constructive analyses and suggestions regarding many of the
current problems. These Reports, however, are merely a starting
point, and cannot implement or monitor the ongoing problems that
will surely surface in the future. In this regard, an independent
SICA should continue to assess the conclusions of these Reports
with a view toward implementation and monitoring, much the
same way that it focused and acted upon the numerous suggestions
proffered by the SEC and others after McMahon.336
Moreover, the suggestions recommended by those Reports are
numerous, quite extensive, and often unrelated. Accordingly, they
should be examined on an issue-by-issue basis. Some have sug-
gested, however, that the Ruder Report is a delicate balance born
out of compromise and, therefore, should be accepted on an "all or
nothing" basis. That would be unfortunate, and it is hardly justifi-
able to suggest to someone who has filed a timely claim in arbitra-
tion regarding a devastating loss suffered by the outrageous,
unethical and fraudulent conduct of an unscrupulous broker that
their claim for punitive damages will be artificially capped because
it was bargained away as part of a trade-off to eliminate the six-
year eligibility rule.
VI. Continuing Role of SICA
At one point, SICA considered the creation of a single independ-
ent forum to administer, with SEC oversight, all securities arbitra-
333. Id. at 151.
334. See infra notes 336-346 and accompanying text.
335. See NYSE REPORT, supra note 5. The Report offers suggestions or reaches
conclusions regarding: (i) restrictive clauses in arbitration agreements; (ii) greater
participation of the parties in the arbitrator selection process; (iii) reasoned opinions
in employment cases, or where punitive damages are awarded (iv) formulating lists of
presumptively discoverable documents to be produced; and (v) development of a pi-
lot mediation program. Id. at 1-2.
336. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. See also Katsoris XI, supra note
318.
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tions involving the public.337 While SICA ultimately decided it
would not pursue that course because it was not evident that mate-
rial economies of scale would result from a single forum, it con-
cluded that it would continue to explore alternative methods of
improving the governance and image of SRO arbitration.338 Uni-
formity, consistency, and fairness, however, are and remain vital to
the success of the Uniform Code. 339 Inconsistencies among SRO
rules unfortunately lead to confusion and forum shopping, and
often constitute a trap for the unwary.34 °
From time to time, it has been suggested that, because the Uni-
form Code has been extensively updated since McMahon, SICA's
role has diminished, implying that like old soldiers, it should fade
away. 341 The scenario then suggests, in the interest of uniformity
and economy, that all the SROs collapse their public arbitration
programs into one, leaving the public securities arbitration function
solely to the NASD.342 This suggestion is ludicrous because SROs,
by their very makeup, presently lack the structural independence
necessary to insure public confidence.343 Indeed, as the arbitrable
issues expand (i.e., employment issues), and as the stakes grow
(i.e., larger compensatory awards and punitive damages issues), the
public will increasingly demand that the rules of battle be set by a
truly independent group.
337. See NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1643. See also Philip J. Hoblin, The
Case For a Single Securities and Commodities Arbitration Forum, COMMODITIES L.
LETTER 3, 5 (Aug. 1989); Katsoris V, supra note 87, at 475.
"A single independent forum entails exactly what it indicates-a forum in-
dependent from actual, inferential, subtle, practical or any other kind of im-
aginable pressure. The forum ahould be independent of the industry,
independent of the plaintiff's bar, and other than the SEC's general over-
sight role, independent of that regulatory body."
Id.
338. Hoblin, supra note 337, at 3, 5.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See Letter from William J. Fitzpatrick General Counsel of the SIA (Dec. 22,
1993). See also Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1152; Feedback, SEc. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR, Feb. 1993, at 2, 6. This possibility was also raised by the RUDER REPORT, supra
note 307 and accompanying text.
342. See Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1152.
343. Id.; see also NYSE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 1592:
.... SROs are dominated by industry. I don't mean their staffs. I think the
New York Stock Exchange has a board half public, half not public. The
NASD's board, however, is more largely dominated, so any rules they adopt
may reflect or appear to reflect, their affiliation with industry, which is usu-
ally in the defense position. I think this is not where I would start a labora-
tory for tort reform. I don't think it would be perceived as balanced.
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In the past, the SEC has opposed the idea of a single forum,
preferring the competitive choices offered by the various SROs.3"
Perhaps a truly independent single forum is a Utopian dream; but
until such a forum can be created, the SEC's theory of competitive
forces is preferable-particularly in an atmosphere where arbitra-
tion is basically mandatory. Why should public customers be
forced to arbitrate before an NASD forum when the disputes are
with brokers who are members of other SROs, and involve transac-
tions executed solely at the other SROs?
As for continuing the role of SICA, it is noteworthy that in the
majority opinion in McMahon, Justice O'Connor reflected upon
the previous mistrust Of arbitration as follows: "[T]he mistrust of
arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is
difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has pre-
vailed since that time. This is expressly so in light of the interven-
ing changes in the regulatory structure of the securities laws. ' 345 It
is respectfully suggested that the single most important event
bridging the Supreme Court's mistrust expressed in Wilko and its
confidence evidenced in McMahon was the creation of SICA in
1977.
Similarly, in a dissenting opinion in McMahon, Justice Blackmun
observed that:
It is true that arbitration procedures in the securities industry
have improved since Wilko's day. Of particular importance has
been the development of a code of arbitration by the Commis-
sion with the assistance of representatives of the securities in-
dustry and the public....
This code has been used to harmonize the arbitration proce-
dure among the SROs. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitra-
tion of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 279, 283-
384 (1984) (Katsoris). As the Commission explained: [T]his
[Code] marks a substantial improvement over the various arbi-
tration procedures currently being utilized by the securities in-
dustry and represents an important step towards establishing a
uniform system for resolving investor complaints through arbi-
tration. SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 16390 (Nov. 30, 1979). 44
Fed. Reg. 70616, 70617.346
The present system of checks and balances, in place for 20 years,
has worked relatively well. It has resulted in steady and meaning-
344. NYSE SyMposiuM, supra note 5, at 1649.
345. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987)(em-
phasis added).
346. Id at 258 (emphasis added).
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ful change from the Balkanized procedures of the past. It also has
prevented some ill-conceived ideas from finding their way into se-
curities arbitration.347
Under the present system, SICA, an independent body, proposes
rule changes. The SRO boards approve and file them with the
SEC. The SEC then decides what the rule will be. By that time, all
participants have had at least two bites at the apple: the public at
the SICA level, and at the 19(b) filing; the various SROs at the
SICA level, and at their board's level; the industry at the SICA
level, at the SRO level (where it lobbies intensely), and again at the
19(b) filing; and, the SEC at the SICA level (where SEC represent-
atives and others are invited guests), and as the final word at the
19(b) filing. The pattern for rule changes in securities arbitration
should be preserved.
VH. Conclusion
Because the courts are furnished and subsidized by the govern-
ment itself, many claimants consider them to be more neutral fo-
rums than arbitrations conducted before SROs, which are
perceived to be controlled by the securities industry.348 Yet, after
studying nearly two thousand arbitration cases brought by consum-
ers against brokers in 1989-90, the General Accounting Office
("GAO"), which conducts investigations for Congress, found "no
indication of a pro industry bias" in decisions at industry sponsored
forums.349 Indeed, the GAO also found that investors won about
sixty percent of their arbitration cases, with awards also averaging
about sixty percent of the amounts claimed. 35 0 Thus, it would ap-
pear that the McMahon court's confidence in arbitration has thus
far been justified.351
On the other hand, the public will not accept being forced into
an arbitration system where its rights are unilaterally "bargained"
away by form agreements.352 Whatever relief is available in court
should generally also be available in arbitration. 3  The alternative
347. See Offer of Award Rule, supra notes 75-82; see also Attachment Rule, supra
notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
348. See Katsoris V, supra note 87, at 452-53.
349. See General Accounting Office Report, Securities Arbitration, How Investors
Fare, at 7 (1992) [hereinafter GAO Report]; see also Michael McGowan, See You In
Arbitration, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 110.
350. See GAO Report, supra note 349, at 7.
351. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
352. See Katsoris X, supra note 231, at 145.
353. Id.
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of throwing thousands of cases back to congested court calendars is
certainly not the answer. In such a scenario, the securities industry
would be plagued by excessive litigation costs, which either directly
or indirectly would be ultimately borne by the public as the indus-
try's cost of doing business. In addition, the public would often be
denied justice because of the excessive costs and delays associated
with courtroom litigation.354 Yet, the present mandatory process
will work only so long as the playing field is perceived to be, and in
fact remains, level for all.
Our securities markets today are not only national, but global in
scope. Resolving industry disputes with customers and employees
should not depend upon legalistic gerrymandering. Reasonable
rules of arbitration should, to every extent possible, be uniform
throughout the United States, so that a customer on the East Coast
has the same basic rights as a customer on the West Coast.355
Moreover:
"To insure ... public investment we must retain the public's
confidence-confidence in the markets themselves and confi-
dence that should a dispute arise, it will be fairly resolved. This
confidence, however, can only be earned by maintaining a de
facto as well as a de jure image of fairness. In other words, the
procedural rules must be fair and the administration of the fo-
rum must be objective and independent.... 356
In this regard, SICA's stabilizing influence, together with the
SEC's oversight role, continues to generate investor confidence in
the SRO arbitration system. Just as the investing public is well
served by an independent Financial Accounting Standard Board
("FASB") in the formulation of financial reporting rules (with SEC
oversight), so too is it well served by an independent SICA in es-
tablishing and maintaining a level playing field (with similar SEC
participation) should a controversy arise.357 Indeed, SICA's very
354. See Business Cases Clog Courts, 17 NAT. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 1. See also
Arleen Jacobius, California Three-Strikes Law Gobbling Up Jurors, 81 Dec. A.B.A. J.
29 (1995).
355. See Katsoris X, supra note 231, at 145.
356. Constantine N. Katsoris, statement before The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Dec. 8, 1977)(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal); See also Buck,
supra note 27.
357. See Katsoris IV, supra note 29, at 1152; see also SEC's Chief Accountant
Stresses Importance of an Independent FASB, 32 BNA, Feb. 16, 1996, at G1; Lee Ber-
ton, SEC Chairman Will Resist Any Move to Boost Business Influence on FASB,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1996, at B6; Itzah Sharav, No Accounting for this Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, § 3, p13 :
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presence during these past twenty years, like the cop on the beat,
has been reassuring to the regulators, the courts and the public. 358
In the final analysis, however, we can never become complacent
and feel as though we have achieved the perfect dispute resolution
system, for in a less-than-perfect world, "[f]aws and institutions are
constantly tending to gravitate. Like clocks, they must be occa-
sionally cleansed, and wound up, and set to true time. ' 359
As the end of my tenure as a Public Member of SICA ap-
proaches, I would like to thank SICA for the privilege and oppor-
tunity to have served since its creation, 360 and wish its role in the
next twenty years be as independent and constructive as the first
twenty have been.
The business executives, financial analysts, accountants and lawyers who
agreeed on an independent F.A.S.B. did so out of enlightened self-interest,
knowing it was the only alternative to government takeover .... Especially
troublesome is the institute's proposal that a "third party organization
should control and oversee F.A.S.B. agenda." With its independence thus in
jeopardy, the board's stature and ability to improve financial disclosure
would diminish.
Id. (emphasis added).
358. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. Such reassurance is even more
important with the influx of employment cases since Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See NYSE SyMposiuM, supra note 5, at 1613-24.
359. HENRY WARD BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (1858).
360. I would also like to thank Louis A. Korahais, Esq. and Robert A. Driscoll for
involving me in this area of securities dispute resolution long before my appointment
to SICA. Lou, as the then NASD Director of Arbitration, first appointed me as a
Public Arbitrator (1968); and Bob, as Chairman of the NASD National Arbitration
Committee, appointed me a Public Member of that committee (1975). I learned
much from these experiences at a time when securities arbitration was basically vol-
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Section 1
Arbitration
(a) Any dispute, claim, or controversy between a (customer or
non-member) and a (member, allied member, member organiza-
tion, and/or associated person) arising in connection with the busi-
ness of such (member, allied member, member organization, and/
or associated person) in connection with his activities as an associ-
ated person shall be arbitrated under the Constitution and Rules of
the (name of self-regulatory organization) as provided by any duly
executed and enforceable written agreement or upon the demand
of the customer or non-member.
(b) Under this Code, the (name of self-regulatory organization)
shall have the right to decline the use of its arbitration facilities in
any dispute, claim, or controversy where -having due regard for
the purposes of the (name of self-regulatory organization) and the
intent of this Code - such dispute, claim, or controversy is not a
proper subject matter for arbitration.
(c) Claims which arise out of transactions in a readily identifi-
able market may, with the consent of the Claimant, be referred to
the arbitration forum for that market by the (name of self-regula-
tory organization).
(d) Class Action Claims
(1) A claim submitted as a class action will not be eligible for
arbitration under this Code at the (name of self-regulatory
organization).
(2) Any claim filed by a member or members of a putative or
certified class action is also ineligible for arbitration at the (name
of self-regulatory organization) if the claim is encompassed by a
putative or certified class action filed in federal or state court, or is
ordered by a court to a non self-regulatory organization arbitration
forum for classwide arbitration. However, such claims shall be eli-
gible for arbitration in accordance with Rule (SRO Rule [allowing
investors to submit any claim to arbitration]) or pursuant to the
parties' contractual agreement, if any, if a claimant demonstrates
that it has elected not to participate in the putative or certified
class action or, if applicable, has complied with any conditions for
withdrawing from the class prescribed by the court.
Disputes concerning whether a particular claim is encompassed
by a putative or certified class action shall be referred by the Direc-
tor of Arbitration to a panel of arbitrator(s) in accordance with
SICA
Section 2 or Section 8 of the Code, as applicable. Either party may
elect instead to petition the court with jurisdiction over the puta-
tive or certified class action to resolve such disputes. Any such pe-
tition to the court must be filed within ten business days of receipt
of notice that the Director of Arbitration is referring the dispute to
a panel of arbitrator(s).
(3) No member or associated person shall seek to enforce any
agreement to arbitrate against a customer, other member or person
associated with a member who has initiated in court a putative
class action or is a member of a putative or certified class with re-
spect to any claims encompassed by the class action unless and un-
til: (A) the class certification is denied; (B) the class is decertified;
(C) the customer, other member or person associated with a mem-
ber is excluded from the class by the court; or (D) the customer,
other member or person associated with a member elects not to
participate in the putative or certified class action or, if applicable,
has complied with any conditions for withdrawing from the class
prescribed by the court.
(4) No member, allied member, member organization and/or as-
sociated person shall be deemed to have waived any of its rights
under this Code or under any agreement to arbitrate to which it is
party except to the extent stated in this paragraph.
Section 2
Simplified Arbitration
(a) Any dispute, claim, or controversy, arising between a public
customer(s) and an associated person or a member subject to arbi-
tration under this Code involving a dollar amount not exceeding
$10,000 exclusive of attendant costs and interest, shall be arbitrated
as hereinafter provided.
(b) The Claimant shall file with the Director of Arbitration an
executed Submission Agreement and a copy of the Statement of
Claim of the controversy in dispute and the required deposit, to-
gether with documents in support of the Claim. Sufficient copies of
the Submission Agreement and the Statement of Claim and sup-
porting documents shall be provided to the Director of Arbitration
for each party and the arbitrator. The Statement of Claim shall
specify the relevant facts, the remedies sought, and whether a hear-
ing is demanded.
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(c) The Claimant shall pay a filing fee and remit a hearing de-
posit as specified in Section 30 of this Code upon filing of the Sub-
mission Agreement. The final disposition of the sum shall be
determined by the arbitrator.
(d) The Director of Arbitration shall endeavor to serve
promptly by mail or otherwise on the Respondent(s) one (1) copy
of the Submission Agreement and one (1) copy of the Statement of
Claim. Within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the State-
ment of Claim, Respondent(s) shall serve each party with an exe-
cuted Submission Agreement and a copy of Respondent's Answer.
Respondent's executed Submission Agreement and Answer shall
also be filed with the Director of Arbitration with sufficient copies
for the arbitrator(s) along with any deposit required under the
schedule of fees. The Answer shall designate all available defenses
to the Claim and may set forth any related Counterclaim and/or
related Third-Party Claim the Respondent(s) may have against the
Claimant or any other person. If the Respondent(s) has interposed
a Third-Party Claim, the Respondent(s) shall serve the Third-Party
Respondent with an executed Submission Agreement, a copy of
Respondent's Answer containing the Third-Party Claim, and a
copy of the original Claim filed by the Claimant. The Third-Party
Respondent shall respond in the manner herein provided for re-
sponse to the Claim. If the Respondent(s) files a related Counter-
claim exceeding $10,000, the arbitrator may refer the Claim,
Counterclaim, and/or Third-Party Claim, if any, to a panel of three
(3) or more arbitrators in accordance with Section 8 of this Code,
or he may dismiss the Counterclaim and/or Third-Party Claim,
without prejudice to the Counterclaimant(s) and/or Third-Party
Claimant(s) pursuing the Counterclaim and/or Third-Party Claim
in a separate proceeding. The costs to the Claimant under either
proceeding shall in no event exceed the total amount specified in
Section 30 of this Code.
(e) All parties shall serve promptly by mail or otherwise on all
other parties and the Director of Arbitration, with sufficient copies
for the arbitrators, a copy of the Answer, Counterclaim, Third-
Party Claim, or other responsive pleading, if any. The Claimant, if
a Counterclaim is asserted against him, shall within ten (10) calen-
dar days either (i) serve on each party a reply to any Counterclaim
or, (ii) if the amount of the Counterclaim exceeds the Claim, shall
have the right to file a statement withdrawing the Claim. If the
SICA
Claimant withdraws the Claim, the proceedings shall be discontin-
ued without prejudice to the rights of the parties.
(f) The dispute, claim, or controversy shall be submitted to a sin-
gle arbitrator knowledgeable in the securities industry selected by
the Director of Arbitration. Unless the public customer demands
or consents to a hearing, or the arbitrator calls a hearing, the arbi-
trator shall decide the dispute, claim, or controversy solely upon
the pleadings and evidence filed by the parties. If a hearing is nec-
essary, such hearing shall be heard as soon as practicable at a locale
selected by the Director of Arbitration.
(g) The Director of Arbitration may grant extensions of time to
file any pleading upon a showing of good cause.
(h)(1) The arbitrator shall be authorized to require the submis-
sion of further documentary evidence as he, in his sole discretion,
deems advisable.
(2) If a hearing is demanded or consented to, in accordance
with Section 2(f), the General Provision Governing a Pre-Hearing
Proceeding under Section 20 shall apply.
(3) If no hearing is demanded or consented to, all requests
for document production shall be submitted in writing to the Di-
rector of Arbitration within ten (10) business days of notification
of the identity of the arbitrator selected to decide the case. The
requesting party shall serve simultaneously its requests for docu-
ment production on all parties. Any response or objection to the
requested document production shall be served on all parties and
filed with the Director of Arbitration within five (5) business days
of receipt of the requests for production. The selected arbitrator
shall resolve all requests under this section on the papers
submitted.
(i) Upon the request of the arbitrator, the Director of Arbitra-
tion shall appoint two (2) arbitrators to the panel that shall decide
the matter in controversy.
() In any case where there is more than one (1) arbitrator, the
majority will be public arbitrators.
(k) In his discretion, the arbitrator may, at the request of any
party, permit such party to submit additional documentation relat-
ing to the pleadings.
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(1) Except as otherwise provided herein, the general arbitration
rules of the (name of self-regulatory organization) shall be applica-
ble to proceedings instituted under this Code.
Section 3
Hearing Requirements - Waiver of Hearing
(a) Any dispute, claim, or controversy, except as provided in
Section 2 (Simplified Arbitration) shall require a hearing unless all
parties waive such hearing in writing and request that the matter be
resolved solely upon the pleadings and documentary evidence.
(b) Notwithstanding a written waiver of a hearing by the parties,
a majority of the arbitrators may call for and conduct a hearing. In




(a) No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for sub-
mission to arbitration under this Code if six (6) years have elapsed
from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or the dispute,
claim, or controversy. This section shall not extend applicable stat-
utes of limitation.
(b) Where eligibility is disputed by a responding party after ser-
vice of the Statement of Claim, the Director of Arbitration shall
promptly make a final determination as to whether a claim is eligi-
ble for arbitration. Any such determination regarding eligibility
shall set forth the occurrence or event which was the basis for the
determination of eligibility of the dispute, claim or controversy.
The identification of the occurrence or event which formed the ba-
sis for a determination that a claim is eligible shall not limit any
parties' right to offer evidence to the arbitrators which relates to
their substantive claims or defenses.
(c) A determination by the Director of Arbitration pursuant to
subparagraph (b) that a claim is ineligible shall not constitute a bar
to asserting the underlying claim in a judicial forum. The parties
will have available to them the rights and remedies provided by
applicable law, notwithstanding, any (i) existing pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreement or (ii) decision on eligibility. No party shall seek
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to enforce any agreement to arbitrate where the claim has been
determined to be ineligible under this section.
Section 5
Dismissal of Proceedings
(a) At any time during the course of an arbitration, the arbitra-
tors may, either upon their own initiative or at the request of a
party, dismiss the proceeding and refer the parties to their judicial
remedies or to any other dispute resolution forum agreed to by the
parties without prejudice to any claims or defenses available to any
party, or other remedies provided by law.
(b) The arbitrators may dismiss a claim, defense or proceeding
with prejudice as a sanction for willful and intentional failure to
comply with an order of the arbitrator(s) if lesser sanctions have
proven effective.




All settlements submitted shall be at the election of the parties.
Section 7
Tolling of Time Limitation(s) for The Institution of
Legal Proceedings
(a) Where permitted by law, the time limitation(s) that would
otherwise run or accrue for the institution of legal proceedings
shall be tolled when a duly executed Submission Agreement is filed
by the Claimant(s). The tolling shall continue for such period as
the (name of self-regulatory organization) shall retain jurisdiction
upon the matter submitted.
(b) The six (6) year time limitation upon submission to arbitra-
tion shall not apply when the parties have submitted the dispute,
claim, or controversy to a court of competent jurisdiction. The six
(6) year time limitation shall not run for such period as the court
shall retain jurisdiction over the matter submitted.
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Section 8
Designation of the Number of Arbitrators
(a)(1) In all arbitration matters involving public customers and
nonmembers where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, or
where the matter in controversy does not involve or disclose a
money claim, the Director of Arbitration shall appoint an arbitra-
tion panel that shall consist of no less than three (3) arbitrators, at
least a majority of whom shall not be from the securities industry,
unless the public customer or non-member requests a panel con-
sisting of at least a majority from the securities industry.
(2) An arbitrator will be deemed as being from the securities
industry if he or she:
(i) Is a person associated with a member, or broker-dealer, gov-
ernment securities broker, government securities dealer, munici-
pal securities dealer, or registered investment adviser, or
(ii) Has been associated with any of the above within the past
three (3) years, or (iii) Is retired from any of the above, or
(iv) Is an attorney, accountant, or other professional who de-
voted twenty (20) percent or more of his or her professional
work effort. to securities industry clients within the last two
years. (v) Is an individual who is registered under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act or is a member of a registered futures associa-
tion or any commodities exchange or is associated with any such
person(s).
(3) An arbitrator who is not from the securities industry shall
be deemed a public arbitrator. A person will not be classified as a
public arbitrator if he or she has a spouse or other member of the
household who is a person associated with a registered broker,
dealer, municipal securities dealer, government securities broker,
government securities dealer, or investment adviser.
(b) Composition of Panels
The individuals who shall serve on a particular arbitration panel
shall be determined by the Director of Arbitration. The Director
of Arbitration may name the chairman of each panel.
Section 9
Notice of Selection of Arbitrators
The Director of Arbitration shall inform the parties of the arbi-
trators' names, employment histories for the past ten (10) years, as
well as information disclosed pursuant to Section 11, at least fifteen
(15) business days prior to the date fixed for the first hearing ses-
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sion. A party may make further inquiry of the Director of Arbitra-
tion concerning an arbitrator's background. In the event that prior
to the first hearing session, any arbitrator should become disquali-
fied, resign, die, refuse, or otherwise be unable to perform as an
arbitrator, the Director of Arbitration shall appoint a replacement
arbitrator to fill the vacancy on the panel. The Director of Arbitra-
tion shall inform the parties as soon as possible of the name and
employment history of the replacement arbitrator for the past ten
(10) years, as well as information disclosed pursuant to Section 11.
A party may make further inquiry of the Director of Arbitration
concerning the replacement arbitrators background and, within the
time remaining prior to the first hearing session or the ten (10) day
period provided under Section 10, whichever is shorter, may exer-




In any arbitration proceeding, each party shall have the right to
one peremptory challenge. In arbitrations where there are multi-
ple Claimants, Respondents, and/or Third-Party Respondents, the
Claimants shall have one peremptory challenge, the Respondents
shall have one peremptory challenge, and the Third-Party Respon-
dents shall have one peremptory challenge, unless the Director of
Arbitration determines that the interests of justice would best be
served by awarding additional peremptory challenges. Unless ex-
tended by the Director of Arbitration, a party wishing to exercise a
peremptory challenge must do so by notifying the Director of Ar-
bitration in writing within ten (10) business days of notification of
the identity of the persons named under Section 20(d), (e) or Sec-
tion 9, whichever comes first. There shall be unlimited challenges
for cause.
Section 11
Disclosures Required by Arbitrators
(a) Each arbitrator shall be required to disclose to the Director
of Arbitration any circumstances that might preclude such arbitra-
tor from rendering an objective and impartial determination. Each
arbitrator shall disclose:
(1) Any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in
the outcome of the arbitration.
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(2) Any existing or past financial, business, professional,
family or social relationships that are likely to affect impartiality or
that might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias.
Persons requested to serve as arbitrators should disclose any such
relationships that they personally have with any party or its coun-
sel, or with any individual whom they have been told will be a wit-
ness. They should also disclose any such relationship involving
members of their families, or their current employers, or their cur-
rent employers' partners or business associates.
I (b) Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitra-
tors should make a reasonable effort to inform themselves of any
interests or relationships described in paragraph (a) above.
(c) The obligation to disclose interests, relationships, or circum-
stances that might preclude an arbitrator from rendering an objec-
tive and impartial determination described in subsection (a) hereof
is a continuing duty that requires a person who accepts appoint-
ment as an arbitrator to disclose, at any stage of the arbitration,
any such interests, relationships, or circumstances that arise, or that
are recalled or discovered.
(d) Prior to the commencement of the first hearing session, the
Director of Arbitration may remove an arbitrator based on infor-
mation disclosed pursuant to this section. The Director of Arbitra-
tion shall also inform the parties of any information disclosed
pursuant to this section if the arbitrator who disclosed the informa-
tion is not removed.
Section 12
Disqualification or Other Disability of Arbitrators
In the event that any arbitrator, after the commencement of the
first hearing session but prior to the rendition of the award, should
become disqualified, resign, die, refuse, or. otherwise be unable to
perform as an arbitrator, the remaining arbitrator(s) may continue
with the hearing and determination of the controversy unless such
continuation is objected to by any party within five (5) days of noti-
fication of the vacancy on the panel. Upon objection, the Director
of Arbitration shall appoint a new member to the panel to fill any
vacancy. The Director of Arbitration shall inform the parties as
soon as possible of the name and employment history for the past
ten (10) years of the replacement arbitrator, as well as information
disclosed pursuant to Section 11. A party may further ask the Di-
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rector of Arbitration about the replacement arbitrators back-
ground and, within the time remaining prior to the next scheduled
hearing session or the ten (10) day period provided under Section
10, whichever is shorter, may exercise its right to challenge the re-
placement arbitrator as provided in Section 10.
Section 13
Initiation of Proceedings
Except as otherwise provided herein, an arbitration proceeding
under this Code shall be instituted as follows:
(a) Statement of Claim
The Claimant shall file with the Director of Arbitration an exe-
cuted Submission Agreement, a Statement of Claim, together with
documents in support of the claim, and the required deposit. Suffi-
cient additional copies of the Submission Agreement and the State-
ment of Claim and supporting documents shall be provided to the
Director of Arbitration for each party and for each arbitrator. The
Director of Arbitration shall endeavor to serve promptly by mail
or otherwise on the Respondent(s) one (1) copy of the Submission
Agreement and one (1) copy of the Statement of Claim.
(b) Service and Filing with the Director of Arbitration
For purposes of the Code of Arbitration Procedure, service may
be effected by mail or other means of delivery. Service and filing
are accomplished on the date of mailing either by first-class post-
age prepaid or by means of overnight mail service or, in the case of
other means of service, on the date of delivery. Filing with the
Director of Arbitration shall be made on the same date as service.
(c) Answers - Defenses, Counterclaims, and/or Cross-Claims
(1) Within twenty (20) business days from receipt of the State-
ment of Claim, the Respondent(s) shall serve each party with an
executed Submission Agreement and a copy of Respondent(s) An-
swer. An executed Submission Agreement and Answer of the Re-
spondent(s) shall also be filed with the Director of Arbitration with
sufficient additional copies for the arbitrator(s), along with any de-
posit required under the schedule of fees. The Answer shall spec-
ify all available defenses and relevant facts that will be relied upon
at the hearing. It also may set forth any related Counterclaim the
Respondent(s) may have against the Claimant, and Cross-Claim
the Respondent(s) may have against any other named Respon-
dent(s), and any Third-Party Claim against any other party or per-
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son based upon any existing dispute, claim, or controversy subject
to arbitration under this Code.
(2)(i) A Respondent, Responding Claimant, Cross-Claimant,
Cross-Respondent, or Third-Party Respondent who pleads only a
general denial as an answer may, upon objection by a party, in the
discretion of the arbitrators, be barred from presenting any fact or
defenses at the time of the hearing.
(ii) A Respondent, Responding Claimant, Cross-Claimant,
Cross-Respondent, or Third-Party Respondent who fails to specify
all available defenses and relevant facts in such party's answer may,
upon objection by a party, in the discretion of the arbitrators, be
barred from presenting such facts or defenses not included in such
party's answer at the hearing.
(iii) A Respondent, Responding Claimant, Cross-Claimant,
Cross-Respondent, or Third-Party Respondent who fails to file an
answer within twenty (20) business days from receipt of service of a
claim, unless the time to answer has been extended pursuant to
paragraph (c)(5), may, in the discretion of the arbitrators, be
barred from presenting any matter, arguments, or defenses at the
hearing.
(3) Respondent(s) shall serve each party with a copy of any
Third-Party Claim. The Third-Party Claim shall also be filed with
the Director of Arbitration with sufficient additional copies for the
arbitrator(s), along with any deposit required under the schedule
of fees. Third-Party Respondent(s) shall answer in the manner
provided for response to the Claim, as provided in (1) and (2)
above.
(4) The Claimant shall serve each party with a reply to a Coun-
terclaim within ten (10) business days of receipt of an Answer con-
taining a Counterclaim. The reply shall also be filed with the
Director of Arbitration with sufficient additional copies for the
arbitrator(s).
(5) The Director of Arbitration may extend any period in this
section (whether such be denominated as a Claim, Answer, Coun-
terclaim, Cross-Claim, Reply, or Third-Party pleading).
(d) Joining and Consolidation - Multiple Parties
(1) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as
claimants if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction; oc-
currence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any ques-
tion of law or fact common to all these parties will arise in the
action. All persons may be joined in one action as respondents if
1 SICA
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alterna-
tive, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all respondents will
arise in the action. A claimant or respondent need not be inter-
ested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded.
Judgment may be given for one or more of the claimants according
to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more respon-
dents according to their, respective liabilities.
(2) In arbitrations where there are multiple claimants, respon-
dents and/or third party respondents, the Director of Arbitration
shall be authorized to determine preliminarily whether such parties
should proceed in the same or separate arbitrations. Such determi-
nations will be considered subsequent to the filing of all responsive
pleadings.
(3) The Director of Arbitration shall be authorized to determine
preliminarily whether claims filed separately are related and shall
be authorized to consolidate such claims for hearing and award
purposes.
(4) All final determinations with respect to joining, consolida-
tion, and multiple parties under this subsection shall be made by
the arbitration panel.
Section 14
Designation of Tne and Place of Hearings
The time and place for the initial hearing shall be determined by
the Director of Arbitration and each hearing thereafter by the ar-
bitrators. Notice of the time and place for the initial hearing shall
be given at least fifteen (15) business days prior to the date fixed
for the hearing by personal service, registered, or certified mail to
each of the parties unless the parties shall, by their mutual consent,
waive the notice provisions under this section. Notice for each
hearing, thereafter, shall be given as the arbitrators may determine.
Attendance at a hearing waives notice thereof.
Section 15
Representation by an Attorney
All parties shall have the right to be represented by an attorney
at any stage of the proceedings. Issues regarding the qualifications
of a person to represent a party in arbitration are governed by ap-
plicable law and may be determined by an appropriate court or
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other regulatory agency. In the absence of a court order, the arbi-
tration proceeding shall not be stayed or otherwise delayed pend-
ing resolution of such issues.
Section 16
Attendance at Hearings
The attendance or presence of all persons at hearings, including
witnesses, shall be determined by the arbitrators. However, all




If any of the parties, after due notice, fail to appear at a hearing
or at any continuation of a hearing session, the arbitrators may, in
their discretion, proceed with the arbitration of the controversy. In
such cases, all awards shall be rendered as if each party had en-
tered an appearance in the matter submitted.
Section 18
Adjournments
(a) The arbitrators may, in their discretion, adjourn any hear-
ing(s) either on their own initiative or on the request of any party
to the arbitration.
(b) Unless waived by the Director of Arbitration, a party re-
questing an adjournment after arbitrators have been appointed
shall deposit a fee, equal to the initial deposit of forum fees for the
first adjournment and twice the initial deposit of forum fees, not to
exceed $1,000, for a second or subsequent adjournment requested
by that party. If the adjournment is not granted the deposit shall
be refunded. If the adjournment is granted, the arbitrators may
direct the return of the adjournment fee.
(c) Upon receiving a third request consented to by all parties for
an adjournment, the arbitrators may dismiss the arbitration with-





The arbitrators shall acknowledge to all parties present that they
have read the pleadings filed by the parties.
Section 20
General Provisions Governing A Pre-Hearing Proceeding
(a) Requests for Documents and Information
The parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in the
voluntary exchange of information to expedite the arbitration.
Any request for documents or other information should be spe-
cific, relate to the matter in controversy, and afford the party to
whom the request is made a reasonable period of time to respond
without interfering with the time set for the hearing.
(b) Document Production and Information Exchange
(1) Any party may serve a written request for information or
documents ("information request") upon another party twenty
(20) business days or more after service of the Statement of Claim
by the Director of Arbitration or upon filing of the Answer, which-
ever is earlier. The requesting party shall serve the information
request on all parties and file a copy with the Director of Arbitra-
tion. The parties shall endeavor to resolve disputes regarding an
information request. Such efforts shall be set forth in the
objection.
(2) Unless a greater time is allowed by the requesting party, in-
formation requests shall be satisfied or objected to within thirty
(30) calendar days from the date of service. Any objection to an
information request shall be served by the objecting party on all
parties and filed with the Director of Arbitration.
(3) Any response to objections to information requests shall be
served on all parties and filed with the Director of Arbitration and
within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of the objection.
(4) Upon the written request of a party who does not receive the
sought information the matter will be referred by the Director of
Arbitration to either a pre-hearing conference under paragraph (d)
of this section or to a selected arbitrator under paragraph (e) of
this section.
(c) Pre-Hearing Exchange
At least twenty (20) calendar days prior to the first scheduled
hearing date, all parties shall serve on each other copies of docu-
SICA
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
ments in their possession and shall identify witnesses they intend to
present at the hearing. The parties may provide a list of those doc-
uments that have already been produced pursuant to the other pro-
visions of this Section 20 instead of the actual documents. A list of
such documents served under this paragraph shall be served on the
Director of Arbitration at the same time and in the same manner
as service on the parties. In addition, at least twenty (20) calendar
days prior to the first scheduled hearing date, the parties also shall
serve on each other a list identifying witnesses they intend to pres-
ent at the hearing by name, address and business affiliation. A
copy of the list of witnesses shall be served on the Director of Arbi-
tration at the same time and in the same manner as service on the
parties. The arbitrators may exclude from the arbitration any doc-
uments not exchanged or identified or witnesses not identified in
accordance with the requirements of this paragraph. This does not
require service of copies of documents or of a list identifying wit-
nesses that parties may use for cross examination or rebuttal.
(d) Pre-Hearing Conference
(1) Upon the written request of a party, an arbitrator, or at the
discretion of the Director of Arbitration, a pre-hearing conference
shall be scheduled. The Director of Arbitration shall set the time
and place of a pre-hearing conference and appoint a person to pre-
side. The pre-hearing conference may be held by telephone con-
ference call. The presiding person shall seek to achieve agreement
among the parties on any issues that relate to the pre-hearing pro-
cess or to the hearing including, but not limited to, the exchange of
information, exchange or production of documents, identification
of witnesses, identification and exchange of hearing documents,
stipulations of facts, identification and briefing of contested issues,
and any other matters that will expedite the arbitration
proceedings.
(2) Any issues raised at the pre-hearing conference that are not
resolved may be referred by the Director of Arbitration to a single
member of the Arbitration Panel for decision.
(e) Decisions by Selected Arbitrator
The Director of Arbitration may appoint a single member of the
Arbitration Panel to decide all unresolved issues referred to under
this section. Such arbitrator shall be authorized to act on behalf of
the panel to issue subpoenas, direct appearances and production of
documents, and set deadlines. Decisions under this paragraph shall
be based on the papers submitted by the parties, unless the arbitra-
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tor calls a hearing. The arbitrator may elect to refer any issue
under this paragraph to the full panel.
(f) Subpoenas
The arbitrator(s) and any attorney(s) of record to the proceeding
shall have the power of subpoena process as provided by law. All
parties shall be given a copy of the subpoena upon its issuance.
The parties shall produce witnesses and present proofs to the ful-
lest extent possible without resort to the subpoena process.
(g) Power to Direct Appearance and Production of Documents
The arbitrator(s) shall be empowered without resort to the sub-
poena process to direct the appearance of any person employed by
or associated with any member or member organization of the self-
regulatory organization and/or the production of any records in the
possession or control of such persons or members. Unless the arbi-
trator(s) directs otherwise, the party requesting the appearance of
a person or the production of documents under this section shall
bear all reasonable costs of such appearance and/or production.
Section 21
Evidence
The arbitrators shall determine the materiality and relevance of
any evidence proffered and shall not be bound by rules governing
the admissibility of evidence.
Section 22
Interpretation of and Enforcement of Arbitrator Rulings
The arbitrator(s) shall be empowered to interpret and determine
the applicability of all provisions under this Code and to take ap-
propriate action to obtain compliance with any ruling by the arbi-
trator(s), including but not limited to imposing sanctions pursuant
to Section 5. Such interpretations and actions to obtain compliance
shall be final and binding upon the parties.
Section 23
Determinations of Arbitrators
All rulings and determinations of the panel shall be by a majority
of the arbitrators.
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Section 24
Record of Proceedings
A verbatim record by stenographic reporter or tape recording of
all arbitration hearings shall be kept. If a party or parties to a dis-
pute elect to have the record transcribed, the party or parties mak-
ing the request shall bear the cost of such transcription unless the
arbitrators direct otherwise. The arbitrators may also direct that
the record be transcribed. If the record is transcribed at the re-
quest of any party, a copy shall be provided by the arbitrators.
Section 25
Oaths of the Arbitrators and Witnesses
Prior to the commencement of the first session, an oath or affir-
mation shall be administered to the arbitrator(s). All testimony
shall be under oath or affirmation.
Section 26
Amendments
(a) After the filing of any pleadings, if a party desires to file a
new or different pleading, such change must be made in writing
and filed with the Director of Arbitration with sufficient additional
copies for each arbitrator. The party filing a new or different
pleading shall serve on all other parties, a copy of the new or differ-
ent pleading in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section
13(b). The other parties may, within ten (10) business days from
the receipt of service, file a response with all other parties and the
Director of Arbitration in accordance with Section 13(b).
(b) After a panel has been appointed, no new or different plead-
ings may be filed except for a responsive pleading as provided for
in (a) above or with the panel's consent.
Section 27
Reopenings of Hearings
Where permitted by law, the hearings may be reopened by the
arbitrators on their own motion or in the discretion of the arbitra-





(a) All awards shall be in writing and signed by a majority of the
arbitrators or in such manner as is required by law. Such awards
may be entered as a judgment in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
(b) Unless the law directs otherwise, all awards rendered pursu-
ant to this Code shall be deemed final and not subject to review or
appeal.
(c) The Director of Arbitration shall endeavor to serve a copy of
the award:
(i) by facsimile transmission or other electronic means; or
(ii) by registered or certified mail upon all parties or their coun-
sel, at the address of record; or (iii) by personally serving the
award upon the parties; or (iv) by filing or delivering the award
in such a manner as may be authorized by law.
(d) The arbitrator(s) shall endeavor to render an award within
thirty (30) business days from the date the record is closed.
(e) The award shall contain the name of the parties, the name(s)
of counsel, if any, a summary of the issues, including the type(s) of
any security or product, in controversy, the damages and/or other
relief requested, the damages and/or other relief awarded, a state-
ment of any other issues resolved, the names of the arbitrators, and
the signatures of the arbitrators concurring in the award.
(f) Summary information contained in the awards shall be made
publicly available in accordance with policies of the sponsoring
self-regulatory organization.
(g) All monetary awards shall be paid within thirty (30) days of
receipt unless a motion to vacate has been filed with a court of
competent jurisdiction. An award shall bear interest from the date
of the award:
(1) if not paid within thirty (30) days of receipt,
(2) if the award is the subject of a motion to vacate which is
denied, or
(3) as specified by the arbitrator(s) in the award. Interest
shall be assessed at the legal rate, if any, then prevailing in the
state where the award was rendered, or at a rate set by the
arbitrator(s).
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(h) The arbitrator(s) may grant any remedy or relief that the
arbitrator(s) deem just and equitable and that would have been
available in a court with jurisdiction over the matter.
Section 29
Agreement to Arbitrate
This Code shall be deemed a part of and incorporated by refer-
ence in every agreement to arbitrate under the Constitution and
Rules of the (name of self-regulatory organization) including a
duly executed Submission Agreement.
Section 30
Schedule of Fees
(a) At the time of filing a Claim, Counterclaim, Third-Party
Claim, or Cross-Claim, a party shall pay a non-refundable filing fee
and shall remit a hearing session deposit with the (name of self-
regulatory organization) in the amounts indicated in the schedules
below unless such fee or deposit is specifically waived by the Direc-
tor of Arbitration.
Where multiple hearing sessions are required, the arbitrator(s)
may require any of the parties to make additional hearing deposits
for each additional hearing session. In no event shall the amount
deposited by all parties per hearing session exceed the amount of
the initial hearing deposit made by any party under the schedule
below.
(b) A hearing session is any meeting between the parties and
the arbitrator(s), including a pre-hearing conference, which lasts
four (4) hours or less. The forum fee for a pre-hearing conference
with an arbitrator shall be the amount set forth in the schedules
below as a hearing session deposit for a hearing with a single
arbitrator.
(c) The arbitrators, in their award, shall determine the amount
chargeable to the parties as forum fees and shall determine who
shall pay such forum fees. Forum fees chargeable to the parties
shall be assessed on a per hearing session basis and the aggregate
for each hearing session may equal but shall not exceed the amount
of the largest initial hearing deposit deposited by any party, except
in a case where claims have been joined subsequent to filing in
which cases hearing session fees shall be computed as provided in
paragraph (d). The arbitrators may determine in the award that a
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party shall reimburse to another party any non-refundable filing
fee it has paid.
If a customer is assessed forum fees in connection with an indus-
try claim, forum fees assessed against the customer shall be based
on the hearing deposit required under the industry claims schedule
for the amount awarded to industry parties to be paid by the cus-
tomer and not based on the size of the industry claim. No fees
shall be assessed against a customer in connection with an industry
claim that is dismissed; however, in cases where there is also a cus-
tomer claim, the customer may be assessed forum fees based on
the customer claim under the procedure set out above.
Amounts deposited by a party shall be applied against forum
fees, if any.
In addition to forum fees, the arbitrator(s) may determine in the
award the amount of costs incurred pursuant to Sections 18, 20
and 24 and, unless applicable law directs otherwise, other costs and
expenses of the parties and arbitrator(s) which are within the scope
of the agreement of the parties. The arbitrator(s) shall determine
by whom such costs shall be borne.
If the hearing session fees are not assessed against a party who
had made a hearing deposit, the hearing deposit will be refunded
unless the arbitrators determine otherwise.
(d) For claims filed separately and subsequently joined or con-
solidated under Section 13(d) of this Code, the hearing deposit and
forum fees assessable per hearing session after joinder or consoli-
dation shall be based on the cumulative amount in dispute. The
arbitrator(s) shall determine by whom such forum fees shall be
borne.
(e) If the dispute, claim, or controversy does not involve, dis-
close or specify a money claim, the non-refundable filing fee for a
public customer shall be $250 and the nonrefundable filing fee for
an industry party shall be $500. The hearing session deposit to be
remitted by a party shall be $600 or such greater or lesser amounts
as the Director of Arbitration or the panel of arbitrators may re-
quire, but shall not exceed $1,000.
(f) The (name of self-regulatory organization) shall retain the
total initial amount deposited as hearing session deposits by all the
parties in any matter submitted and settled or withdrawn within
eight business days of the first scheduled hearing session other than
a pre-hearing conference.
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(g) Any matter submitted and thereafter settled or withdrawn
subsequent to the commencement of the first hearing session, in-
cluding a pre-hearing conference with an arbitrator, shall be sub-
ject to an assessment of forum fees and costs incurred pursuant to
Sections 18, 20 and 24 based on hearing sessions held and sched-
uled within eight business days after the (name of self-regulatory
organization) received notice that the matter has been settled or
withdrawn. The arbitrator(s) shall determine by whom such forum
fees and costs shall be borne.
Schedule of Fees
For purposes of the schedule of fees below the term claim in-
cludes claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, and third party claims.
Any such claim made by a customer is a customer claim. Any such





Filing Fee Hearing Session Deposit
Amount in Dispute Paper 1 Arbitrator 3 Arbitrators
$.01-$1,000 $ 15 $15 $ 15 N/A
$1,000.01-$2,500 $ 25 $25 $ 25 N/A
$2,500.01-$5,000 $ 50 $75 $100 N/A
$5,000.01-$10,000 $ 75 $75 $200 N/A
$10,000.01-$30,000 $100 N/A $300 $ 400
$30,000.01-$50,000 $120 N/A $300 $ 400
$50,000.01-$100,000 $150 N/A $300 $ 500
$100,000.01-$500,000 $200 N/A $300 $ 750
$500,000.01-$5,000,000 $250 N/A $300 $1,000
Over $5,000,000 $300 N/A $300 $1,500
INDUSTRY CLAIMANT
Filing Fee Hearing Session Deposit
Amount in Dispute Paper 1 Arbitrator 3 Arbitrators
$.01-$1,000 $500 $75 $300 N/A
$1,000.01-$2,500 $500 $75 $300 N/A
$2,500.01-$5,000 $500 $75 $300 N/A
$5,000.01-$10,000 $500 $75 $300 N/A
$10,000.01-$30,000 $500 N/A $300 $ 600
$30,000.01-$50,000 $500 N/A $300 $ 600
$50,000.01-$100,000 $500 N/A $300 $ 600
$100,000.01-$500,000 $500 N/A $300 $ 750
$500,000.01-$5,000,000 $500 N/A $300 $1,000
Over $5,000,000 $500 N/A $300 $1,500
Section 31
Requirements When Using Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
With Customers
(a) Any pre-dispute arbitration clause shall be highlighted and
shall be immediately preceded by the following disclosure language
(printed in outline form as set forth herein) that shall also be
highlighted:
(1) Arbitration is final and binding on the parties.
(2) The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court,
including the right to jury trial.
(3) Pre-arbitration discovery is generally more limited than and
different from court proceedings.
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(4) The arbitrators award is not required to include factual find-
ings or legal reasoning and any party's right to appeal or to seek
modification of rulings by the arbitrators is strictly limited.
(5) The panel of arbitrators will typically include a minority of
arbitrators who were or are affiliated with the securities industry.
(b) Immediately preceding the signature line, there shall be a
statement that shall be highlighted and separately initialed by the
customer that the agreement contains a pre-dispute arbitration
clause. This statement shall also indicate at what page and para-
graph the arbitration clause is located.
(c) A copy of the agreement containing any such clause shall be
given to the customer who shall acknowledge receipt thereof on
the agreement or on a separate document.
(d) No agreement shall include any condition that limits or con-
tradicts the rules of any self-regulatory organization or limits the
ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limits the ability
of the arbitrators to make any award.
(e) All agreements shall include a statement that "No person
shall bring a putative or certified class action to arbitration, nor
seek to enforce any pre-dispute arbitration agreement against any
person who has initiated in court a putative class action; who is a
member of a putative class who has not opted out of the class with
respect to any claims encompassed by the putative class action un-
til; (i) the class certification is denied; or (ii) the class is decertified;
or (iii) the customer is excluded from the class by the court. Such
forbearance to enforce an agreement to arbitrate shall not consti-
tute a waiver of any rights under this agreement except to the ex-
tent stated herein."
(f) The requirements of subsection (5) shall apply only to new
agreements signed by an existing or new customer of a member or





American Stock Exchange, Inc. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
Total Cases Public Total Cases Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public
1980 45 41 18 11 35 16 1980 318 234 134 113 122 56
1981 39 40 7 11 42 22 1981 422 422 142 177 242 It
1982 37 31 9 4 16 10 1982 606 435 157 139 276 140
1983 41 42 14 8 10 6 1983 768 549 216 147 272 161
1984 69 53 16 14 41 24 1984 1.108 747 298 244 381 196
1985 64 58 21 14 45 26 1985 1.400 962 377 250 434 232
1986 63 60 20 28 31 14 1986 1.587 1,199 390 327 476 248
1987 92 74 34 24 .41 24 1987 2886 1,625 458 325 642 364
1988 100 63 21 29 27 12 1988 3.990 2169 1,084 539 934 432
1989 69 73 26 15 26 13 1989 3,651 4.050 1.417 967 2,097 1.130
1990 69 72 21 21 25 15 1990 3,617 4.019 703 900 1,530 826
1991 51 64 is 22 25 17 1991 4,150 4,037 787 665 1.419 775
1992 45 55 12 15 23 8 1992 4,379 4.375 793 717 1.552 821
1993 48 55 11 12 15 8 1993 5.419 4,327 852 851 1.329 730
1994 68 46 13 9 10 3 1994 5.570 4.561 992 725 1.111 532
1995 252 63 86 28 14 8 1995 6,055 5.680 994 1.159 1523 788
Boston Stock Exchange, Inc. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Total Cases Public Total Cases Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public
1985 2 2 2 2 2 0 1980 367 327 131 110 221 119
1981 2 2 2 2 0 0 1981 477 433 117 134 214 111
1982 1 1 1 1 1 1 1982 558 473 109 113 214 118
1983 2 2 2 2 2 1 1983 713 532 136 122 276 137
1984 0 0 8 0 8 0 1984 1008 796 176 183 259 113
1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 1985 1,095 962 198 190 424 221
1986 2 2 2 2 2 0 1986 965 1.004 181 205 432 210
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 1987 1,050 1,001 225 204 378 200
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 1988 1.623 1.196 263 235 440 228
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 1989 1.407 1.458 201 229 527 267
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 1990 1.378 1,466 222 199 499 256
1991 1 0 0 0 0 0 1991 1.403 1,496 187 199 451 185
1992 1 1 0 0 0 0 1992 873 1,166 83 119 317 137
1993 0 1 0 0 0 0 1993 810 837 72 62 205 92
1994 0 8 0 0 0 0 1994 711 795 62 74 186 80
1995 1 0 0 8 0 8 1995 810 784 53 61 175 74
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. Pacific Stock Exchange, Inc.
Total Cases Public Total Canes Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public
1980 44 31 11 11 18 6 1980 24 28 12 11 4 3
1981 41 32 10 8 12 3 1981 24 20 17 17 9 5
1982 50 38 6 6 14 3 1982 31 21 15 11 10 7
1983 75 45 5 4 13 6 1983 35 29 17 17 23 10
1984 91 56 24 16 4 3 1984 45 26 21 11 10 7
1985 64 38 10 5 0 0 1985 50 40 12 18 20 12
1986 72 44 16 9 12 9 1986 41 37 9 13 18 8
1987 130 93 29 33 22 9 1987 64 58 27 11 23 13
1988 149 89 22 27 48 12 1988 99 77 30 40 45 20
1989 71 105 17 20 43 14 1989 61 93 19 27 86 37
1990 67 85 16 18 32 16 1990 93 68 25 25 45 26
1991 46 62 5 12 13 9 1991 86 82 21 17 33 21
1992 28 28 7 5 11 5 1992 58 65 16 13 27 16
1993 15 18 3 4 6 2 1993 199 54 130 22 23 12
1994 23 24 1 3 4 1 1994 102 93 37 57 38 18
1995 15 26 6 6 5 0 1995 76 166 15 118 79 39
Chicago (Midwest) Stock Exchange, Inc. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc.
Total Cases Public Total Cases Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public
198D 2 2 1 0 1 1 1980 7 0 16 4 4 2
1981 2 2 0 0 0 0 1981 2 2 2 2 0 0
1982 1 0 0 0 0 0 1982 2 2 1 1 0 0
1983 2 2 0 0 0 0 1983 23 19 14 10 10 2
1984 1 0 0 0 0 0 1984 29 19 6 8 10 3
1985 1 0 0 0 0 0 1985 23 26 15 11 11 3
1986 4 0 1 0 0 0 1986 21 18 11 13 12 4
1987 5 3 1 1 1 1 1987 24 21 24 17 9 3
1988 1 7 0 0 0 0 1988 20 15 5 14 2 1
1989 5 6 0 0 0 0 1989 32 22 9 10 15 7
1998 4 3 0 0 1 1 1990 29 34 5 9 Is 7
1991 5 2 0 0 0 0 1991 33 32 13 15 is 8
1992 I 2 0 0 0 0 1992 21 18 2 3 4 1
1993 1 0 0 0 0 0 1993 40 24 5 3 5 3
1994 1 1 0 0 0 0 1994 44 37 8 6 7 4
1995 1 0 0 0 0 0 1995 52 63 8 7 21 9
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Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Composite Arbitration Figures
Total Cases Public TIal Cases Public
TIal Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in Tbtal Concluded Small Small Customer Awards in
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of Cases Including Claims Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public Year Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided Public
198D 21 21 7 7 3 2 1980 830 686 332 269 410 205
1981 25 25 5 5 7 4 1981 1.034 976 302 356 526 263
1982 33 16 7 7 13 6 1982 1.319 1.031 305 282 544 285
1983 78 40 17 9 14 5 1983 1.737 1,259 421 319 620 328
1984 113 8 20 17 34 21 1984 2,464 1.774 561 493 734 369
1985 91 118 31 35 54 31 1985 2.788 2,198 664 523 964 531
1986 82 89 30 21 30 15 1986 2.837 2,463 658 617 1,022 508
1987 106 90 38 34 42 24 1987 4.357 2,964 836 649 1.166 638
1988 11s 126 49 52 63 37 1988 6.097 3,742 1,474 927 1.559 742
1989 108 93 41 40 50 36 1989 5,404 5,900 1,730 108 2.844 1.504
1990 75 90 41 32 40 22 1990 5.332 5.837 1.033 1.204 2.187 1.169
1991 94 82 35 41 38 18 1991 5.869 5.857 1.063 971 1.994 1.033
1992 45 68 12 19 31 14 1992 5.451 5,779 925 891 1.965 1.=2
1993 30 47 15 18 34 6 1993 6-62 5363 1088 922 1.617 853
1994 12 23 3 8 11 5 1994 6,531 5.580 1,116 882 1,367 643
1995 9 5 1 3 I 1 1995 7.271 6,787 1.163 1.382 1.818 919
1996] SICA
Appendix C
SECTIONS OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRA-




































tion of Time and
Place of Hearings
Section 15: Represen-


























































Section 34 Section 13 Rule 601














Rule 18.10(a) Section 12 Section 19 Rule 607
Rule 18.10(b) Section 8
Rule 18.11 Sections 8
& 14
Rule 18.12 Section 8
Rule 18.13 Section 13
Rule 602(g) Rule 18.14
Rule 606 Rule 18.15
Rule 608(a) Rule 18.16
Rule 608(b) Rule 18.17
Rule 608(c) Rule 18.18
Rule 608(d) Rule 18.19
Rule 608(e) Rule 18.20





















Section 20 Rule 607(b) Rule 12-8(f)
Section 21 Rule 608 Rule 12-9
Section 22 Rule 609
Section 23 Rule 610
Section 14 Section 24 Rule 611
Section 5 Section 25 Rule 612
Section 16 Section 26 Rule 613
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UNIFORM CODE
OF ARBITRATION
Section 24: Record of
Proceedings





























Rule 616 Rule 18.29 Section 29
Rule 617 Rule 18.30 Section 30
Rule 618 Rule 18.31 Section 31
Rule 619 Rule 18.32 Section 32
Rule 620 Rule 18.33 MRSB
Rule
A-16
































*For differences between the SICA Uniform Code and various SRO rules, see supra notes 255-61 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, some SROs have rules for which there are no SICA counterparts, for example:
NASD Section 46 provides for special procedures for large and complex cases.
